The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion
Open accessAbstract
We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Kőoszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold. (JEL D82, D86, J41, M52, M12)
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Koszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/121.4.1133 · Cited by 2,728
Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experience of monetary gains and losses
Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., & Shizgal, P. (2001) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/s0896-6273(01)00303-8 · Cited by 1,404
Mellers, B., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.3.332 · Cited by 839
Cited by
Reference Points and Effort Provision
Abeler, J., Falk, A., Goette, L., & Huffman, D. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.470 · Cited by 831
Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans
Kőszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.909 · Cited by 586
Marzilli Ericson, K. M., & Fuster, A. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr034 · Cited by 354
Kőszegi, B. (2014) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.52.4.1075 · Cited by 317
Metadata
- Authors
- Herweg, F., Müller, D., & Weinschenk, P.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-12-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2451-2477
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2234668531
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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