The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Repeated Games and Reputations
Abstract
This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated games and reputations, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout; they are interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications of the theory. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games as well as those using repeated games as tools in more applied research. The classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring are presented, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. More recent developments are also presented, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. The book provides an integration of game theory and economics, moving from the theory of repeated games to the study of economic relationships.
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Citations
Cites
(1994) · Cited by 5,513
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
Simon, H. A., Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089260 · Cited by 1,944
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,846
Stigler, G. J. (1964) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258853 · Cited by 1,760
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1973) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01737554 · Cited by 887
Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships
Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2006) · OUP Catalogue · Cited by 702
Self-citationThe Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. R. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.411 · Cited by 495
Cited by
Biais, B., Bisière, C., Bouvard, M., & Casamatta, C. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy095 · Cited by 565
Navigating a social world with robot partners: A quantitative cartography of the Uncanny Valley
Mathur, M. B., & Reichling, D. B. (2016) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.008 · Cited by 439
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory
Peysakhovich, A., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168 · Cited by 303
FlipIt: The Game of “Stealthy Takeover”
van Dijk, M., Juels, A., Oprea, A., & Rivest, R. L. (2013) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-012-9134-5 · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2006-09-01
- OpenAlex
- W2487793673
- Cited by
- 810
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 13.60
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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