The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
Open accessAbstract
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
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Cites
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BackgroundDeception: The Role of Consequences
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Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Almenberg, J., Altmejd, A., Chan, T., et al. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaf0918 · Cited by 1,314
Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?
Lumineau, F., Wang, W., & Schilke, O. (2021) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2020.1379 · Cited by 532
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dulleck, U., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-04-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 526-555
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-7981
- OpenAlex
- W2036388272
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 43.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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