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Cited by 346

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition

Open access
Dulleck, Uwe, Kerschbamer, Rudolf, Sutter, Matthias·2011·American Economic Review

Abstract

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

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Metadata

Authors
Dulleck, U., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2011-04-01
Volume
101
Issue
2
Pages
526-555
ISSN
  • 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
  • 1944-7981
OpenAlex
W2036388272
Cited by
346
References
30
FWCI
43.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.101.2.526
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Dulleck, U., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M. (2011). The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.526

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.