The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
Open accessAbstract
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, U. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · Cited by 9,510
Information and Consumer Behavior
Nelson, P. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259630 · Cited by 5,758
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947 · cited 1×
“1 It is noteworthy that Darby and Karni ( 1973 ) were, in fact, obstetricians for two strands of literature on credence goods.”
BackgroundDeception: The Role of Consequences
Gneezy, U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828662 · Cited by 1,729
(2010) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/(issn)1756-2171 · Cited by 1,574
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x · Cited by 1,491
An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
Greiner, B. (2004) · Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) · Cited by 1,233
On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods
Dulleck, U., & Kerschbamer, R. (2006) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205106776162717 · Cited by 739
Self-citationPhysician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery
Gruber, J., & Owings, M. (1996) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555794 · Cited by 400
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts
Emons, W. (1997) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555942 · Cited by 340
Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services
Wolinsky, A. (1993) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555964 · Cited by 308
Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery
Gruber, J., Kim, J., & Mayzlin, D. (1999) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s0167-6296(99)00009-0 · Cited by 284
Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan
Iizuka, T. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00115.x · Cited by 192
Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods
Feddersen, T. J., & Gilligan, T. W. (2001) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00149.x · Cited by 185
Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods
Feddersen, T. J., & Gilligan, T. W. (2001) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1162/105864001300122584 · Cited by 174
Huck, S., Lünser, G. K., & Tyran, J. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.010 · Cited by 165
An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in the Vehicle Inspection Market
Hubbard, T. N. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555895 · Cited by 162
Credence Goods, Efficient Labelling Policies, and Regulatory Enforcement
Baksi, S., & Bose, P. (2006) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-006-9032-0 · Cited by 133
Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
Pesendorfer, W., & Wolinsky, A. (2003) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00250 · Cited by 117
Efficiency gains from team-based coordination-large-scale experimental evidence
Feri, F., Irlenbusch, B., & Sutter, M. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1892 · Cited by 98
Self-citationWhen do Experts Cheat and Whom do They Target
Fong, Y. (2005) · Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) · Cited by 98
A Theory of Fraud and Overtreatment in Experts Markets
Alger, I., & Salanié, F. (2006) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00120.x · Cited by 70
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and CompetitionPreprint
Dulleck, U., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1359217 · Cited by 59
Self-citationCompetition Fosters TrustPreprint
Huck, S., Lünser, G. K., & Tyran, J. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.946887 · Cited by 32
Pricing and TrustPreprint
Huck, S., Lünser, G. K., & Tyran, J. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.960295 · Cited by 15
Cited by
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Almenberg, J., Altmejd, A., Chan, T., et al. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaf0918 · Cited by 1,314
Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?
Lumineau, F., Wang, W., & Schilke, O. (2021) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2020.1379 · Cited by 532
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Bolton, G., Greiner, B., & Ockenfels, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- Dulleck, U., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-04-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 526-555
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-7981
- OpenAlex
- W2036388272
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 43.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.