The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection
Abstract
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)
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Cited by
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
Oster, E. (2019) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711 · Cited by 5,367
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,536
Self-citationAlesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
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Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: a meta-analysis
Balliet, D., Wu, J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0037737 · Cited by 1,126
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, R., & Chen, Y.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-10-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2562-2589
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2010064710
- Cited by
- 396
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 50.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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