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Cited by 396

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

Chen, Roy, Chen, Yan·2011·American Economic Review

Abstract

When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)

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Metadata

Authors
Chen, R., & Chen, Y.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2011-10-01
Volume
101
Issue
6
Pages
2562-2589
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2010064710
Cited by
396
References
62
FWCI
50.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.101.6.2562
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Chen, R., & Chen, Y. (2011). The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2562

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