The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology.
Shelley, M., & Krippendorff, K. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288384 · Cited by 24,312
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004) · Political Psychology · doi:10.4324/9780203505984-16 · Cited by 13,467
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.612 · Cited by 10,902
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, U. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · Cited by 9,510
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554881 · Cited by 5,585
Social categorization and intergroup behaviour
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202 · Cited by 5,562
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
Camerer, C. F. (2003) · Cited by 3,722
Monderer, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0044 · Cited by 3,543
The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?
Brewer, M. B. (1999) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00126 · Cited by 3,494
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
The Theory of Learning in Games
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (1998) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 2,455
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416
Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105774431243 · Cited by 2,062
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330053147930 · Cited by 1,676
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
Fehr, E. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.106228 · Cited by 1,629
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,536
Self-citationTacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failurePreprint
Huyck, J. B. V., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,534
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
Levine, D. K. (1998) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1006/redy.1998.0023 · Cited by 1,408
The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
Blume, L. E. (1993) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1023 · Cited by 1,402
Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance
Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00111 · Cited by 1,366
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 899
Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/.40.4.1167 · Cited by 859
Individual Behavior and Group Membership
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., & Rustichini, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1340 · Cited by 663
A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001 · Cited by 631
Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
Bagnoli, M., & Lipman, B. L. (1989) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297502 · Cited by 518
Identity economics: how our identities shape our work, wages, and well-being
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-6367 · Cited by 514
The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity
Yamagishi, T., & Kiyonari, T. (2000) · Social Psychology Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2695887 · Cited by 510
The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics
Akerlof, G. A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.1.5 · Cited by 485
Managing diversity by creating team identity
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.01.003 · Cited by 445
Research in experimental economics
(2013) · Experiments in Financial Economics · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2013)0000016009 · Cited by 424
Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555734 · Cited by 369
Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results
Cheung, Y.-W., & Friedman, D. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0544 · Cited by 350
Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule
Selten, R. (1998) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01426214 · Cited by 337
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION GAMES: EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
Bagnoli, M., & Mckee, M. (1991) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01276.x · Cited by 322
Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
Crawford, V. P. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951699 · Cited by 300
Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. J. (2007) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1223 · Cited by 279
The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study
Bornstein, G., Gneezy, U., & Nagel, R. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00012-x · Cited by 258
Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in ‘Weakest-Link’ Games
Knez, M., & Camerer, C. (1994) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250150908 · Cited by 244
Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups
Weber, R. A. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806776157588 · Cited by 238
Hargreaves Heap, S. P., & Zizzo, D. J. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.295 · Cited by 206
Crawford, V. P. (1991) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-x · Cited by 183
Chaudhuri, A., Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02207.x · Cited by 181
Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2000.0800 · Cited by 162
Knez, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2000) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2882 · Cited by 155
An experimental study of costly coordination
Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.006 · Cited by 148
Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.964947 · Cited by 122
A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games
Ui, T. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0729 · Cited by 122
‘Us’ and ‘Them’: the origin of identity, and its economic implications
Eaton, B. C., Eswaran, M., & Oxoby, R. J. (2011) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01652.x · Cited by 82
Arifovic, J., & Ledyard, J. O. (2012) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.013 · Cited by 80
Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A., & Palfrey, T. R. (2010) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230280786_29 · Cited by 78
Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
Menezes, F. M., Monteiro, P. K., & Temimi, A. (2001) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00059-3 · Cited by 76
Groups Work for Women: Gender and Group Identity in Social Dilemmas
Croson, R. T. A., Marks, M. B., & Snyder, J. (2008) · Negotiation Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00195.x · Cited by 76
Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Chen, Y. (2008) · Handbook of experimental economics results · Cited by 46
Self-citationFairness and learning: an experimental examination
Cooper, D. J., & Stockman, C. K. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00011-8 · Cited by 36
Participatory Equity, Identity, and Productivity: Policy Implications for Promoting DevelopmentPreprint
Basu, K. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.957299 · Cited by 16
Identity, Trust and Altruism: Sociological Clues to Economics DevelopmentPreprint
Basu, K. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.956080 · Cited by 13
Identity, Trust and Altruism: Sociological Clues to Economic DevelopmentPreprint
Basu, K. (2006) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 9
Cited by
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
Oster, E. (2019) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711 · Cited by 5,367
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,536
Self-citationAlesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Almenberg, J., Altmejd, A., Chan, T., et al. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaf0918 · Cited by 1,314
Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: a meta-analysis
Balliet, D., Wu, J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0037737 · Cited by 1,126
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, R., & Chen, Y.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-10-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2562-2589
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2010064710
- Cited by
- 396
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 50.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.