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Cited by 646

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Political Resource Curse

Open access
Brollo, Fernanda, Nannicini, Tommaso, Perotti, Roberto, Tabellini, Guido·2013·American Economic Review

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory. (JEL D72, D73, H77, O17, O18)

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Metadata

Authors
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2013-08-01
Volume
103
Issue
5
Pages
1759-1796
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3123568397
Cited by
646
References
32
FWCI
109.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Political Resource Curse. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.103.5.1759
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Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G. (2013). The Political Resource Curse. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.1759

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.