The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Resource Curse
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory. (JEL D72, D73, H77, O17, O18)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables
Angrist, J. D., Imbens, G. W., & Rubin, D. B. (1996) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1996.10476902 · Cited by 4,230
Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive
Baumol, W. J. (1996) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/0883-9026(94)00014-x · Cited by 3,972
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Self-citationEntrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive
Baumol, W. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261712 · Cited by 3,649
Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test,
McCrary, J. (2008) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005 · Cited by 3,600
Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design
Hahn, J., Todd, P., & Klaauw, W. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00183 · Cited by 2,679
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937945 · Cited by 2,092
Political foundations of the resource curse
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.008 · Cited by 1,706
The control of politicians: An economic model
Barro, R. J. (1973) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01718440 · Cited by 1,553
Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil
Ferrara, E. L., Chong, A., & Duryea, S. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.4.1 · Cited by 1,453
Tornell, A., & Lane, P. R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.22 · Cited by 1,448
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 · Cited by 1,319
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War
Ross, M. (2006) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.081304.161338 · Cited by 759
Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from Brazil
Caselli, F., & Michaels, G. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.5.1.208 · Cited by 554
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Diermeier, D., Keane, M., & Merlo, A. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828464 · Cited by 452
ON THE THEORY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
Caselli, F., & Coleman, W. J. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01103.x · Cited by 404
What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil
Brollo, F., & Troiano, U. (2016) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.04.003 · Cited by 398
Self-citationCaselli, F., & Morelli, M. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00023-9 · Cited by 386
GALASSO, V., & NANNICINI, T. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000535 · Cited by 367
Self-citationDO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION
Gagliarducci, S., & Nannicini, T. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12002 · Cited by 357
Self-citationDoes oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa
Vicente, P. C. (2010) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.005 · Cited by 346
Fiscal restraints and voter welfare
Besley, T., & Smart, M. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.009 · Cited by 345
Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T. (2004) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247604323067925 · Cited by 290
Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14906 · Cited by 290
Messner, M., & Polborn, M. K. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.01.004 · Cited by 172
The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2008) · doi:10.3386/w14585 · Cited by 167
The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Education Outcomes and Poverty Reduction
Stephan Litschig, Y., & Morrison, K. M. (2013) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.5.4.206 · Cited by 161
Brollo, F. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 43
Self-citationJudicial Presence and Rent Extraction
Stephan Litschig, Y., & Zamboni, Y. (2023) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/726539 · Cited by 19
Intergovernmental Transfers and Elementary Education: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from BrazilPreprint
Stephan Litschig, Y. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1374854 · Cited by 9
Cited by
What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
Ross, M. L. (2015) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359 · Cited by 1,146
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
Corruption in Developing Countries
Olken, B., & Pande, R. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17398 · Cited by 470
The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment
Amore, M. D., & Bennedsen, M. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.06.002 · Cited by 442
What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil
Brollo, F., & Troiano, U. (2016) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.04.003 · Cited by 398
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2013-08-01
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1759-1796
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123568397
- Cited by
- 646
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 109.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.