How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To combat adverse selection, governments increasingly base payments to health plans and providers on enrollees' scores from risk-adjustment formulae. In 2004, Medicare began to risk-adjust capitation payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to reduce selection-driven overpayments. But because the variance of medical costs increases with the predicted mean, incentivizing enrollment of individuals with higher scores can increase the scope for enrolling “overpriced” individuals with costs significantly below the formula's prediction. Indeed, after risk adjustment, MA plans enrolled individuals with higher scores but lower costs conditional on their score. We find no evidence that overpayments were on net reduced. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
(1980) · Health Care Management Review · doi:10.1097/00004010-198005030-00017 · Cited by 2,504
The Importance of the Normality Assumption in Large Public Health Data Sets
Lumley, T., Diehr, P., Emerson, S., & Chen, L. (2002) · Annual Review of Public Health · doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.23.100901.140546 · Cited by 1,803
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555448 · Cited by 1,763
The Practice of Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary.
Nakamura, A., & Berndt, E. R. (1992) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2290668 · Cited by 1,114
Incentive contracts and performance measurement
Baker, G. P. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261831 · Cited by 1,085
Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating
Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360698441 · Cited by 878
Risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments using the CMS-HCC model.
Pope, G. C., Kautter, J., Ellis, R. P., Ash, A. S., Ayanian, J. Z., lezzoni, L. I., Ingber, M. J., Levy, J. M., & Robst, J. M. (2004) · PubMed Central · Cited by 805
Cost of Care for Elderly Cancer Patients in the United States
Yabroff, K. R., Lamont, E. B., Mariotto, A., Warren, J. L., Topor, M., Meekins, A., & Brown, M. L. (2008) · JNCI: Journal of the National Cancer Institute · doi:10.1093/jnci/djn103 · Cited by 700
Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market
Fang, H., Keane, M. P., & Silverman, D. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/587623 · Cited by 493
What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments
Bitler, M. P., Gelbach, J. B., & Hoynes, H. W. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.4.988 · Cited by 426
Chapter 14 Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets
Van de ven, W. P. M. M., & Ellis, R. P. (2000) · Handbook of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80173-0 · Cited by 409
How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?
Dafny, L. S. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805775014236 · Cited by 396
Information Technology Comes to Medicine
Blumenthal, D., & Glaser, J. P. (2007) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmhpr066212 · Cited by 354
Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures
Einav, L., & Finkelstein, A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.1.115 · Cited by 353
Medicare upcoding and hospital ownership
Silverman, E., & Skinner, J. (2004) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.09.007 · Cited by 350
Abortion Legalization and Child Living Circumstances: Who is the "Marginal Child"?
Gruber, J., Levine, P., & Staiger, D. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556007 · Cited by 263
Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice
Bundorf, M. K., Levin, J., & Mahoney, N. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3214 · Cited by 235
Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?
Dafny, L. S. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1399 · Cited by 175
Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test*
Lazear, E. P. (2006) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.121.3.1029 · Cited by 161
New Risk-Adjustment System Was Associated With Reduced Favorable Selection In Medicare Advantage
McWilliams, J. M., Hsu, J., & Newhouse, J. P. (2012) · Health Affairs · doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2011.1344 · Cited by 128
Physician Payment Review Commission
Rovner, J. (2009) · Health Care Policy and Politics A to Z · doi:10.4135/9781452240121.n289 · Cited by 118
The Effects of Medicare on Medical Expenditure Risk and Financial Strain
Barcellos, S., & Jacobson, M. (2014) · American Economic Journal Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20140262 · Cited by 115
Who benefits when the government pays more? Pass-through in the Medicare Advantage program
Duggan, M., Starc, A., & Vabson, B. (2016) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.07.003 · Cited by 102
Self-citationThe Pragmatist's Guide to Comparative Effectiveness Research
Chandra, A., Jena, A. B., & Skinner, J. (2011) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.2.27 · Cited by 87
Testing for Adverse Selection with “Unused Observables”
Finkelstein, A. N., & Poterba, J. M. (2006) · Cited by 82
The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care
Baicker, K., & Chandra, A. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10709 · Cited by 80
Do health plans risk-select? An audit study on Germany's Social Health Insurance
Bauhoff, S. (2012) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.011 · Cited by 76
Risk Adjustment in Health Care Markets: Concepts and Applications
Ellis, R. P. (2007) · Health care and disease management · doi:10.1002/9783527611294.ch8 · Cited by 67
Managed care and medical expenditures of Medicare beneficiaries
Chernew, M. E., DeCicca, P., & Town, R. (2008) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.07.014 · Cited by 66
Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection
Pau Olivella, Y., & Vera‐Hernández, M. (2006) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.08.002 · Cited by 24
Incorporating New Research Into Medicare Risk Adjustment
Frogner, B. K., Anderson, G. F., Cohen, R. A., & Abrams, C. (2011) · Medical Care · doi:10.1097/mlr.0b013e318202839f · Cited by 21
Cited by
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures
Einav, L., & Finkelstein, A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.1.115 · Cited by 353
Consumer Inertia and Firm Pricing in the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Insurance Exchange
Ericson, K. M. M. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.1.38 · Cited by 183
The anticipatory effects of Medicare Part D on drug utilization
Alpert, A. (2016) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.004 · Cited by 69
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, J., Duggan, M., Kuziemko, I., & Woolston, W.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2014-10-01
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 3335-3364
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1990922874
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 72.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.