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Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data
Open accessAbstract
How large are optimal tariffs? What tariffs would prevail in a worldwide trade war? How costly would a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation be? And what is the scope for future multilateral trade negotiations? I address these and other questions using a unified framework which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. I find that optimal tariffs average 62 percent, world trade war tariffs average 63 percent, the government welfare losses from a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation average 2.9 percent, and the possible government welfare gains from future multilateral trade negotiations average 0.5 percent. (JEL F12, F13, O19)
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Self-citation
Cited by
Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA
Caliendo, L., & Parro, F. (2015) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu035 · Cited by 1,518
“For instance, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Ossa (2014).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ossa, R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2014-12-01
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 4104-4146
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2128275355
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 52.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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