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Cited by 286

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications

Open access
Doepke, Matthias, Kindermann, Fabian·2019·American Economic Review

Abstract

It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers. (JEL C78, D13, J13, J16)

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Metadata

Authors
Doepke, M., & Kindermann, F.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2019-09-01
Volume
109
Issue
9
Pages
3264-3306
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3121518926
Cited by
286
References
50
FWCI
22.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.20160328
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Doepke, M., & Kindermann, F. (2019). Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160328

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.