Fertility in High-Income Countries: Trends, Patterns, Determinants, and Consequences

Falling fertility is the main driver of population aging, with a stronger influence than increasing life expectancy and changing migration patterns.

“falling fertility as such is the main driver of population aging, with a stronger influence than increasing life expectancy and changing migration patterns (see, e.g., Weil 1997, Bloom & Luca 2016, Prettner & Bloom 2020).”

• cites Weil 1997 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Bloom & Luca 2016 sourceSupported
• cites Prettner & Bloom 2020Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The ongoing postponement of childbearing to ages at which fecundity declines naturally leads to a further increase in childlessness.

“At the same time, the ongoing postponement of childbearing to ages at which fecundity declines naturally leads to a further increase in childlessness (Beaujouan 2020, Hwang 2023).”

• cites Beaujouan 2020 sourceSupported
• cites Hwang 2023 sourcePartly supported

  The Cohort Trends in Marriage and Fertility section reports that South Korean women delayed childbirth into their 30s while childlessness rose. It does not establish that age-related declines in fecundity caused the increase in childlessness; the Discussion also considers costs and changing values. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Climate-related extreme weather events tend to depress fertility.

“While findings indicate that climate-related extreme weather events tend to depress fertility (Sellers & Gray 2019)”

• cites Sellers & Gray 2019 sourcePartly supported

  The Results and Discussion report lower fertility intentions after sustained high temperatures and fewer births among farm households after delayed monsoon onset. But the Discussion also reports increased fertility intentions after monsoon delays in other groups and little effect from short-term temperature shocks. The paper therefore supports some fertility-depressing effects, not a general tendency across climate-related extreme weather events; page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.87)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

The risk of losing children during infancy induces precautionary fertility.

“The risk of losing children during infancy has been shown to induce precautionary fertility (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan 2003, Doepke 2005, Fioroni 2010).”

• cites Kalemli-Ozcan 2003 sourceSupported
• cites Doepke 2005 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Fioroni 2010Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

There is a U-shaped relationship between norms toward gender equality and fertility.

“which is in line with the findings of Arpino et al. (2015), who report a U-shaped relationship between norms toward gender equality and fertility.”

• cites Arpino et al. 2015 sourceSupported

Exposure to import competition tends to increase childlessness, in particular among less-educated men.

“Giuntella et al. (2022) report that exposure to import competition tends to increase childlessness, in particular among less-educated men.”

• cites Giuntella et al. 2022 sourceSupported

Motherhood breaks come with an additional penalty due to forgone experience-related earnings increases and skill depreciation.

“motherhood breaks come with an additional penalty due to forgone experience-related earnings increases (see, e.g., Caucutt et al. 2002, Adda et al. 2017) and skill depreciation (Mincer & Ofek 1982, Blackburn et al. 1993).”

• cites Caucutt et al. 2002 sourceSupported
• cites Adda et al. 2017 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Mincer & Ofek 1982 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

A general index of economic uncertainty is negatively related to fertility.

“Gozgor et al. (2021) confirm that a general index of economic uncertainty is negatively related to fertility.”

• cites Gozgor et al. 2021 sourceSupported

Empirical evidence tends to show that children and savings act as substitute instruments for old-age security.

“Empirical evidence tends to show that children and savings act as substitute instruments for old-age security (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2014, Filoso & Papagni 2015, Cigno 2016, Lugauer et al. 2019).”

• cites Banerjee et al. 2014 sourceSupported
• cites Filoso & Papagni 2015Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Cigno 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The deviation from a career track rather than unemployment per se lowers fertility.

“Del Bono et al. (2012, 2015) show that the deviation from a career track rather than unemployment per se lowers fertility.”

• cites Del Bono et al. 2012 sourceSupported
• cites Del Bono et al. 2015Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Biological sterility in industrialized economies is increasing among both women and men due to environmental factors.

“There are strong indications that biological sterility in industrialized economies is increasing among both women and men due to environmental factors (for a survey, see Skakkebæk et al. 2022, Levine et al. 2023).”

• cites Skakkebæk et al. 2022 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Levine et al. 2023 sourcePartly supported

  The Conclusion and wider implications (page unavailable) reports declining sperm counts among men in North America, Europe and Australia, and the Introduction links sperm count to infertility. It does not establish increasing biological sterility in women or show that environmental factors caused the decline; the conclusion calls for research into its causes. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Mass media, such as soap operas in Brazil, play a role in the transmission of low-fertility norms even beyond the immediate influence of peer groups.

“Finally, Ferrara et al. (2012) highlight the role of mass media, such as soap operas in Brazil, in the transmission of low-fertility norms even beyond the immediate influence of peer groups.”

• cites Ferrara et al. 2012 sourceSupported

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, which featured a short-term fertility bust in many countries, most of these countries have experienced a rebound even beyond prepandemic levels.

“Following the pandemic, which featured a short-term fertility bust in many countries (Aassve et al. 2021), most of these countries have experienced a rebound even beyond prepandemic levels (Sobotka et al. 2023).”

• cites Aassve et al. 2021 sourceSupported
• cites Sobotka et al. 2023 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

A numerical exercise based on the United States-Europe trade nexus shows that workforce shrinkage typically harms both economies.

“While adjustment patterns vary depending on whether population aging arises in the large or the small economy, a numerical exercise based on the United States-Europe trade nexus shows that workforce shrinkage typically harms both economies.”

• cites Davis et al. 2022 sourceSupported

Internet access has raised fertility among highly educated women aged 24-39 in Germany, presumably by alleviating the trade-off between childcare and employment.

“but has raised fertility among highly educated women aged 24-39 in Germany, presumably by alleviating the trade-off between childcare and employment (Billari et al. 2019).”

• cites Billari et al. 2019 sourcePartly supported

  The Conclusion reports a positive, though imprecise, effect of broadband access on fertility among highly educated women in Germany aged 25–45. It says the findings are consistent with easier reconciliation of work and motherhood. The cited paper does not establish the claim for the stated 24–39 age group, and its finding concerns broadband rather than Internet access generally. (LLM, conf=0.87)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

According to recent evidence from the United States, matching tends to be positively affected at the point at which individuals are willing to engage in a partnership.

“According to recent evidence from the United States, matching tends to be positively affected at the point at which individuals are willing to engage in a partnership (Sironi & Kashyap 2022).”

• cites Sironi & Kashyap 2022 sourcePartly supported

  The Discussion (page unavailable) reports that Internet access becomes positively associated with partnership status after the mid-20s, when the desire to settle down may grow stronger. It does not measure individuals’ willingness to partner at a specific point or establish that willingness causes matching to improve. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Over the recent past, fertility has begun to dip in the Scandinavian countries although family policies and social norms support gender equity.

“Notably, over the recent past, fertility has begun to dip in the Scandinavian countries although family policies and social norms support gender equity (e.g., Hellstrand et al. 2021).”

• cites Hellstrand et al. 2021 sourceSupported

When families have fewer children, they tend to invest more in the education and health of each child.

“When families have fewer children, they tend to invest more in the education and health of each child (Lee & Mason 2010, Prettner et al. 2013, Strulik et al. 2013).”

• cites Lee & Mason 2010Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Prettner et al. 2013Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Strulik et al. 2013 sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction (p. 6) and Conclusion (p. 30) describe a model in which fewer children are associated with greater education expenditure per child. They do not describe increased investment in children's health; a search for health found no passage supporting that part of the claim. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Investments in health, and women's health in particular, have been shown to further enhance growth.

“Similarly, investments in health (Weil 2007, Bloom et al. 2024), and women's health in particular (Bloom et al. 2020), have been shown to further enhance growth.”

• cites Weil 2007Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Bloom et al. 2024 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Bloom et al. 2020 sourceSupported

Theoretical predictions show that an increase in the birth rate lowers capital accumulation and economic growth both in the two-period overlapping generations framework and in the continuous-time OLG model.

“These findings are broadly consistent with theoretical predictions, which show that an increase in the birth rate lowers capital accumulation and economic growth both in the two-period overlapping generations (OLG) framework (Diamond 1965) and in the continuous-time OLG model (Blanchard 1985, Buiter 1988).”

• cites Diamond 1965Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Blanchard 1985 sourcePartly supported

  In “The Closed Economy” (page unavailable), Blanchard finds that shorter horizons reduce steady-state capital. But “Section I. The Aggregate Consumption Function” defines the relevant parameter as the probability of death, with births balancing deaths so population remains constant. The paper therefore does not establish that an independent increase in the birth rate lowers capital accumulation or economic growth. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites Buiter 1988 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

If education and health investments raise the productivity of workers and allow them to work to older ages, an increase in the retirement age is likely to be more effective than it would be without better health and education.

“if education and health investments raise the productivity of workers and allow them to work to older ages, an increase in the retirement age is likely to be more effective than it would be without better health and education (Kuhn et al. 2015, Sánchez-Romero et al. 2016).”

• cites Kuhn et al. 2015 sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction (page not available in our copy) says better health can raise productivity and that working longer productively requires workers to remain in good health. But it calls the effect of improved productivity on retirement age ambiguous; §3.3 likewise finds opposing effects of pre-retirement health investment. The copy does not address education or compare how effective a retirement-age increase would be with and without better health and education. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites Sánchez-Romero et al. 2016 sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction (page unavailable) says more schooling can raise wages and the marginal benefit of working, while the Conclusion says mortality declines after retirement can lead to later retirement. But the paper does not assess whether education or health investments make an increase in the retirement age more effective; its Conclusion says the model abstracts from mandatory retirement ages. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

A body of literature finds consistent evidence of a strong negative effect of fertility on savings.

“At the microeconomic level, a body of literature, much of it based on the quasi-experimental nature of the introduction and recent relaxation of China's one-child policy (Banerjee et al. 2014, Ge et al. 2018, Choukhmane et al. 2023), has emerged that finds consistent evidence of a strong negative effect of fertility on savings.”

• cites Banerjee et al. 2014 sourceSupported
• cites Ge et al. 2018Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Choukhmane et al. 2023 sourceSupported

The semi-endogenous growth framework with endogenous human capital accumulation can replicate the stylized cross-country pattern of the relation between economic growth and fertility.

“Overall, we have shown that the semi-endogenous growth framework with endogenous human capital accumulation can replicate the stylized cross-country pattern of the relation between economic growth and fertility (Ahituv 2001, Herzer et al. 2012, Strulik et al. 2013).”

• cites Ahituv 2001 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Herzer et al. 2012 sourcePartly supported

  Section 4.1 reports that growth in income per capita leads to reduced fertility, supporting a relationship between growth and fertility. But the Introduction distinguishes cross-country income–fertility associations from within-country changes over time, which this paper studies. It does not establish the claimed cross-country growth–fertility pattern or show that a semi-endogenous model replicates it. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites Strulik et al. 2013 sourceSupported

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Time t evolves discretely.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The production side of the economy is the same as posited by Jones (1995), except that the knowledge production function features the human capital embodied in the scientific workforce instead of the number of scientists.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Households derive utility from consumption, the number of own children, and the education the children enjoy, with decreasing marginal effects.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: A hierarchy of needs holds according to which households prioritize first consumption, then procreation, and finally education, ensured if 1 > α > η > 0.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The costs of children are modeled as forgone parental labor income due to time spent on childcare, and each child requires ψ units of parental time.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Education expenditures of parents are used to pay teachers who educate the children and thereby translate parental education expenditures into children's human capital.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The human capital of children increases with the education resources per child.

With the exception of Israel, the total fertility rate in 2019 is below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman in OECD countries.

“with the exception of Israel, the TFR in 2019 is below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman.”

In recent decades, fertility rates have decreased steadily in all high-income countries.

“In recent decades, fertility rates have decreased steadily in all high-income countries.”

• cites World Bank 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

In all OECD countries, the total fertility rate has fallen between 1960 and 2019.

“We observe that ( a ) in all countries the TFR has fallen (column 4)”

Across OECD countries, the total fertility rate dropped from 3.29 children per woman in 1960 to 1.63 children per woman in 2019.

“Across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the total fertility rate (TFR), which is the number of children that a woman can expect to have given current agespecific fertility rates, has dropped from 3.29 children per woman in 1960 to 1.63 children per woman in 2019 (World Bank 2023).”

• cites World Bank 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Result 1: In the semi-endogenous growth model with human capital and an endogenous education and fertility choice, aggregate human capital growth decreases when fertility increases (and vice versa).

“Result 1. In the semi-endogenous growth model with human capital and an endogenous education and fertility choice, aggregate human capital growth decreases when fertility increases (and vice versa).”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Time t evolves discretely.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The production side of the economy is the same as posited by Jones (1995), except that the knowledge production function features the human capital embodied in the scientific workforce instead of the number of scientists.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Households derive utility from consumption, the number of own children, and the education the children enjoy, with decreasing marginal effects.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: A hierarchy of needs holds according to which households prioritize first consumption, then procreation, and finally education, ensured if 1 > α > η > 0.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The costs of children are modeled as forgone parental labor income due to time spent on childcare, and each child requires ψ units of parental time.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Education expenditures of parents are used to pay teachers who educate the children and thereby translate parental education expenditures into children's human capital.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The human capital of children increases with the education resources per child.

In the single-gender version of the model, an increase in earnings has no impact on fertility.

“Notably, in the single-gender version of the model, an increase in earnings has no impact on fertility.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Time t evolves discretely.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The production side of the economy is the same as posited by Jones (1995), except that the knowledge production function features the human capital embodied in the scientific workforce instead of the number of scientists.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Households derive utility from consumption, the number of own children, and the education the children enjoy, with decreasing marginal effects.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: A hierarchy of needs holds according to which households prioritize first consumption, then procreation, and finally education, ensured if 1 > α > η > 0.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The costs of children are modeled as forgone parental labor income due to time spent on childcare, and each child requires ψ units of parental time.

Result 2: The semi-endogenous growth model with human capital and an endogenous education and fertility choice exhibits a negative effect of population growth on economic growth.

“Result 2. The semi-endogenous growth model with human capital and an endogenous education and fertility choice exhibits a negative effect of population growth on economic growth.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Time t evolves discretely.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The production side of the economy is the same as posited by Jones (1995), except that the knowledge production function features the human capital embodied in the scientific workforce instead of the number of scientists.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Households derive utility from consumption, the number of own children, and the education the children enjoy, with decreasing marginal effects.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: A hierarchy of needs holds according to which households prioritize first consumption, then procreation, and finally education, ensured if 1 > α > η > 0.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The costs of children are modeled as forgone parental labor income due to time spent on childcare, and each child requires ψ units of parental time.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Education expenditures of parents are used to pay teachers who educate the children and thereby translate parental education expenditures into children's human capital.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The human capital of children increases with the education resources per child.

More recent evidence points to a weakening of the quantity-quality trade-off in high-income settings.

“More recent evidence points to a weakening of the quantity-quality trade-off in high-income settings (for an in-depth discussion, see Doepke et al. 2023).”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The expansion of old-age security as part of modern welfare states is one of the channels behind fertility decline.

“Much of the empirical research on the impact of public pension schemes on fertility (for a summary, see Cigno 2016) confirms the social security motive and suggests that the expansion of old-age security as part of modern welfare states is one of the channels behind fertility decline.”

• cites Cigno 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

A change away from traditional to modern norms, the latter supporting contraception and smaller family sizes, can lead to strong social dynamics toward lower fertility.

“Prettner & Strulik (2017) show that a change away from traditional to modern norms, the latter supporting contraception and smaller family sizes, can lead to strong social dynamics toward lower fertility.”

• cites Prettner & Strulik 2017Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Old-age security and access to private capital markets account for a sizeable part of the fertility differences across countries and over time.

“Building on Caldwell (1976, 2005) and calibrating the model to a set of modern countries, Boldrin et al. (2015) show that old-age security and access to private capital markets account for a sizeable part of the fertility differences across countries and over time.”

• cites Boldrin et al. 2015Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Over the past decades, the trade-off between female employment and childbearing has weakened and, to some extent, reversed in many countries.

“Over the past decades, evidence has begun to accumulate suggesting that the trade-off between female employment and childbearing, too, has weakened and, to some extent, reversed in many countries (Doepke et al. 2023).”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The ability to purchase childcare can explain the observation that the decline in fertility has abated among educated high-income earners, while a decline continues among people in lower-income strata.

“Notably, the ability to purchase childcare can explain the observation that the decline in fertility has abated, in particular, among educated high-income earners (Doepke et al. 2023), while a decline continues to take place among people in lower-income strata.”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Ample evidence supports a positive direct effect of income, as increases in male earnings lead to higher fertility in settings in which childcare is mostly performed by women.

“ample evidence supports a positive direct effect of income, as increases in male earnings lead to higher fertility in settings in which childcare is mostly performed by women (Ermisch 1989, Heckman &Walker 1990).”

• cites Ermisch 1989 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Heckman &Walker 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

When parents spend more on the education of their children, one way of affording these expenditures is to reduce the number of children.

“When parents spend more on the education of their children, one way of affording these expenditures is to reduce the number of children. This idea, which came to be known as the quantity-quality trade-off, was first expressed by Becker (1960).”

• cites Becker 1960Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

An increase in (particularly women's) earnings tends to reduce fertility.

“Willis (1973) and Moffitt (1984) were among the first to show that an increase in (particularly women's) earnings tends to reduce fertility”

• cites Willis 1973 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Moffitt 1984 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

During periods of increasing female education and empowerment, expanding labor market opportunities led to a reduction in fertility in many countries.

“Doepke et al. (2023) provide an extensive review of theory and evidence in this respect, confirming that during periods of increasing female education and empowerment,expanding labor market opportunities led to a reduction in fertility in many countries.”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

There is an increasing tendency toward childlessness in several developed countries.

“Doepke et al. (2023) report an increasing tendency toward childlessness in several developed countries.”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The precautionary motive for fertility is no longer considered to play a role in advanced economies with well-developed healthcare systems.

“the precautionary motive for fertility is no longer considered to play a role in advanced economies with well-developed healthcare systems.”

Changes in social norms that honor fathers' engagement with children and make the role of working mom more acceptable or even turn it into a role model may help to contain fertility decline.

“Changes in social norms that honor fathers' engagement with children and make the role of working mom more acceptable or even turn it into a role model (Fernández & Fogli 2006, 2009) may help to contain fertility decline”

• cites Fernández & Fogli 2006Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Fernández & Fogli 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

In some countries and for high income levels, the correlation between per capita GDP and fertility has reversed its sign again, so that fertility once more starts to rise with income.

“In some countries and for high income levels, the correlation has reversed its sign again, so that fertility once more starts to rise with income.”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Higher wages imply higher opportunity costs of the time spent on childcare because this time is no longer available for formal labor supply and for earning a wage income.

“The reason is that higher wages imply higher opportunity costs of the time spent on childcare because this time is no longer available for formal labor supply and for earning a wage income.”

Over the last two centuries, investing in the education of children has become increasingly important because of the structural transition from agriculture to manufacturing, followed by the transition to the service economy.

“Over the last two centuries, investing in the education of children has become increasingly important because of the structural transition from agriculture to manufacturing (see, e.g., Galor et al. 2009), followed by the transition to the service economy in which many jobs are skill intensive.”

• cites Galor et al. 2009Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

A region that faces selective out-migration of young women may not exhibit a decline in its TFR, as long as those women of childbearing ages who are left behind do not reduce their fertility or even increase it.

“One particular measurement problem here is that a region that faces selective out-migration of young women may not exhibit a decline in its TFR, as long as those women of childbearing ages who are left behind do not reduce their fertility or (due to lacking employment prospects or lower education on average) even increase it.”

The departure especially of females in their childbearing ages tends to hasten the downward spiral of home regions, as the reduction in local childbearing diminishes the region's future prospects.

“While the depopulation process may turn into a vicious cycle for the home regions, with lower population densities leading to a slowdown in economic activity and investments in public infrastructure, the departure especially of females in their childbearing ages tends to hasten the downward spiral, as the reduction in local childbearing diminishes the region's future prospects.”

With decreasing fertility, the labor force participation rate tends to increase, particularly that of women.

“With decreasing fertility, the labor force participation rate tends to increase, particularly that of women.”

Internet access, in general, has curbed the teen birth rate in the United States.

“Evidence for the United States suggests that Internet access, in general, has curbed the teen birth rate (Guldi & Herbst 2017)”

• cites Guldi & Herbst 2017Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Differential fertility change is prone to shape socioeconomic inequality by changing the population distribution across socioeconomic strata.

“Against ample evidence of socioeconomic gradients in fertility (for a review, see Doepke et al. 2023), (differential) fertility change is prone to shape socioeconomic inequality by changing the population distribution across socioeconomic strata.”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Many of the causes and channels of fertility decline described for high-income countries apply equally to low-income countries, in particular the economic-demographic transition from Malthusian stagnation to a modern growth regime.

“Although this review focuses on highincome countries, many of the causes and channels described apply equally to low-income countries, in particular in respect to the economic-demographic transition from Malthusian stagnation with high fertility and low economic growth to a modern growth regime with low fertility and high economic growth (Galor & Weil 2000).”

• cites Galor & Weil 2000 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Evidence on reversal of fertility decline at high levels of development is mixed, with some studies pointing to reversal and others showing inconsistent patterns.

“With some evidence pointing to a reversal of fertility decline at high levels of development (Goldstein et al. 2009, Myrskylä et al. 2009, Fox et al. 2019), other work shows more inconsistent patterns (e.g., Myrskylä et al. 2013, Lesthaeghe 2020).”

• cites Goldstein et al. 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Myrskylä et al. 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Fox et al. 2019Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Partnership patterns have shifted away from lifelong marriage to more diverse forms.

“That partnership patterns have shifted away from lifelong marriage to more diverse forms is well established (see, e.g., Seltzer 2019a)”

• cites Seltzer 2019aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Low fertility reduces the long-run support ratio (the number of workers per retiree).

“In terms of the funding of social security as well as health and long-term care, low fertility poses the obvious problem that it reduces the long-run support ratio (the number of workers per retiree).”

A declining population could lead to a shrinking tax base because fewer people have paid jobs.

“At the same time, a declining population could lead to a shrinking tax base because fewer people have paid jobs.”

In an overlapping generations model with realistic demography, a reduction in the birth rate tends to depress aggregate consumption growth and thereby domestic demand.

“Kuhn & Prettner (2018) show that in an overlapping generations model with realistic demography, a reduction in the birth rate tends to depress aggregate consumption growth and thereby (domestic) demand.”

• cites Kuhn & Prettner 2018Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Internal migration often involves the selective migration of young (and educated) women into urban areas with better employment prospects.

“In many cases, this involves the selective migration of young (and educated) women into urban areas with better employment prospects (Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln 2009).”

• cites Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Fertility decline is dampened, in particular, among the better educated.

“In that respect, the evidence reported by Doepke et al. (2023) that fertility decline is dampened, in particular, among the better educated is reassuring to the extent that it suggests a limitation of such a process.”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

In settings with very low fertility, the workforce can shrink, implying labor shortages.

“In settings with very low fertility, the workforce can even shrink, implying labor shortages.”

In a pay-as-you-go system, a decrease in contributors implies a shortfall of funding for given tax and benefit rates.

“In a pay-as-you-go system, the decrease in contributors implies a shortfall of funding for given tax and benefit rates.”

Evidence from China shows a negative impact of Internet access on fertility for all education and age groups.

“By contrast, evidence from China shows a negative impact of Internet access for all education and age groups (Nie et al. 2023).”

• cites Nie et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The impact of Internet access on fertility choices is both age and context dependent.

“However, the impact on fertility choices is both age and context dependent.”

Investments in population health tend to raise the productivity of workers.

“An analogous argument holds for investments in population health, which also tend to raise the productivity of workers (Bloom et al. 2019, 2024).”

• cites Bloom et al. 2019, 2024Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Responding to declining fertility through increased human capital investments cannot fully offset the negative impact of a smaller labor force on aggregate income.

“Studying a macroeconomic model with human capital investments following a quantityquality trade-off that is calibrated to the Chinese economy, Gu (2021) concludes that responding to declining fertility through increased human capital investments cannot fully offset the negative impact of a smaller labor force on aggregate income.”

• cites Gu 2021Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Fertility decline could boost savings and thereby compensate for a declining labor force through investments in physical capital, human capital, technology, and knowledge.

“Conversely, fertility decline could boost savings and, thereby, compensate for a declining labor force through investments in physical capital, human capital, technology, and knowledge.”

The model captures mainly the quantity-quality trade-off as a compensation mechanism for a fall in fertility because this is the effect that prevails in the long run.

“This model captures mainly the quantity-quality trade-off as a compensation mechanism for a fall in fertility because this is the effect that prevails in the long run.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Time t evolves discretely.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The production side of the economy is the same as posited by Jones (1995), except that the knowledge production function features the human capital embodied in the scientific workforce instead of the number of scientists.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Households derive utility from consumption, the number of own children, and the education the children enjoy, with decreasing marginal effects.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: A hierarchy of needs holds according to which households prioritize first consumption, then procreation, and finally education, ensured if 1 > α > η > 0.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The costs of children are modeled as forgone parental labor income due to time spent on childcare, and each child requires ψ units of parental time.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Education expenditures of parents are used to pay teachers who educate the children and thereby translate parental education expenditures into children's human capital.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The human capital of children increases with the education resources per child.

Saving and investment can promote growth if they flow into infrastructure, basic and applied research, and institutional improvements.

“Saving and investment can also promote growth if they flow into infrastructure (Barro 1990, Canning & Pedroni 2008),basic and applied research ( Jones & Williams 1998, Prettner & Werner 2016, Huang et al. 2023), and institutional improvements (Acemoglu & Robinson 2010).”

• cites Barro 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Canning & Pedroni 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Jones & Williams 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Societies that experience declining workforce growth and population aging generate a particularly strong return to investments in technologies that are productivity increasing and labor saving.

“Societies that experience declining workforce growth and population aging generate a particularly strong return to investments in technologies that are productivity increasing and labor saving.”

Technological progress is the main driver of long-run economic growth.

“technological progress as the main driver of long-run economic growth”

• cites Jones & Williams 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Prettner & Werner 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Huang et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Direct payments and tax breaks have been shown to be less effective in terms of raising fertility than policies related to childcare.

“Here, direct payments and tax breaks have been shown to be less effective in terms of raising fertility than policies related to childcare (Doepke et al. 2023).”

• cites Doepke et al. 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

For a plausible calibration, the effect of fertility on capital accumulation is negative even in models with a realistic demographic structure.

“subsequent work by Lau (2009) and SánchezRomero (2013) shows that, for a plausible calibration, the effect of fertility on capital accumulation is negative even in models with a realistic demographic structure.”

• cites Lau 2009Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Sánchez-Romero 2013Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Demographic factors explain a large part of the increase in robot density observed over the past decades.

“Overall, these studies show that demographic factors explain a large part of the increase in robot density (the number of industrial robots per worker) that has been observed over the past decades.”

• cites Stähler 2021Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Acemoglu & Restrepo 2022Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Abeliansky & Prettner 2023 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Optimal individual retirement tends to rise with life expectancy.

“optimal individual retirement tends to rise with life expectancy”

• cites Bloom et al. 2007, 2010Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Kuhn & Prettner 2023Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The extent to which human capital improvements offset population aging or population decline is unclear.

“However, the extent to which human capital improvements offset population aging or population decline is unclear.”

Productivity improvements can go a long way in compensating for a declining labor force.

“Productivity improvements can go a long way in compensating for a declining labor force.”

Economic and social reactions to low fertility such as better education of children, increased labor force participation (particularly of women), increased investments in labor-saving technologies, and later retirement will compensate for some potentially negative economic consequences.

“Here, we argue that economic and social reactions to low fertility such as better education of children, increased labor force participation (particularly of women), increased investments in labor-saving technologies, and later retirement will compensate for some potentially negative economic consequences.”

Immigration is unlikely to fully compensate for the demographic effects of low fertility.

“it is unlikely to fully compensate for them”