The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Economic Theory of GATT
Abstract
We propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, we establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, we argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes. (JEL F02, F13, F15)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
(2010) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/(issn)1467-937x · Cited by 2,966
(2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.i · Cited by 1,665
The Political Economy of Federalism
Chubb, J. E. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956245 · Cited by 1,444
The Regionalization of the World Economy
Frankel, J. A. (1997) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226260228.001.0001 · Cited by 1,309
Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty: Comment
Ciccone, A. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464425 · Cited by 960
Goldberg, P. K. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171803 · Cited by 704
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261999 · Cited by 689
Mayer, W. (1984) · American Economic Review · Cited by 682
The Value of Trade Agreements in the presence of Political pressures
Maggi, G., & Rodriguez‐Clare, A. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250022 · Cited by 513
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_9 · Cited by 475
Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives: Errata
Hillman, A. L. (1984) · American Economic Review · Cited by 437
The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation
Maggi, G. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.190 · Cited by 412
The move toward free trade zones
Krugman, P. (1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 368
Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection
Staiger, R. W., & Tabellini, G. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 340
Self-citationJackson, J., & Jackson, J. H. (1989) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 329
Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure
Caves, R. E. (1976) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/134522 · Cited by 327
Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530151144096 · Cited by 327
Self-citationCohen, S. D. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1960849 · Cited by 257
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON NEGOTIATED TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS
MAYER, W. (1981) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041494 · Cited by 256
The GATT, Law and International Economic Organization
Fulda, C. H., Dam, K., & Jackson, J. H. (1971) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1287532 · Cited by 250
Strategic aspects of trade policy
Dixit, A. K. (1987) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.009 · Cited by 246
Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?
Kennan, J., & Riezman, R. (1988) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526808 · Cited by 227
Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1997) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527376 · Cited by 213
Self-citationGoyal, S., & Joshi, S. (2006) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00395.x · Cited by 207
Gros, D. (1987) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/0022-1996(87)90061-4 · Cited by 202
Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1997) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(96)01443-2 · Cited by 199
Self-citationWhy Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About
Krugman, P. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 198
Canzoneri, M. B., Ethier, W. J., & Grilli, V. (1996) · Cited by 187
Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?
Whalley, J. (1997) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226260228.003.0004 · Cited by 184
Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs
Baldwin, R. (1987) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(87)90132-7 · Cited by 181
The Mercantilist Index of Trade Policy*
Anderson, J. E., & Neary, J. P. (2003) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00083 · Cited by 178
Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2004) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00054-0 · Cited by 165
Self-citationSize, Sunk Cost and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade
McLaren, J. (1994) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8m90h55 · Cited by 136
International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy
Staiger, R. W. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4962 · Cited by 131
Self-citationGame Theory in International Economics
McMillan, J. (2013) · Taylor & Francis eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315014562 · Cited by 90
Reciprocal Trade Liberalization
Bagwell, K. W., & Staiger, R. W. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5488 · Cited by 41
Self-citationA Game-Theoretic View of International Trade Negotiations: Implications for the Developing Countries
McMillan, J. (1989) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-20417-5_2 · Cited by 28
Cited by
Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA
Caliendo, L., & Parro, F. (2015) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu035 · Cited by 1,518
“For instance, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Ossa (2014).”
Fajgelbaum, P. D., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2020) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz036 · Cited by 1,030
Policy Uncertainty, Trade, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for China and the United States
Handley, K., & Limão, N. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141419 · Cited by 988
Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements
Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2002) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081802760199863 · Cited by 802
Francois, J., & Hoekman, B. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.3.642 · Cited by 717
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-03-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 215-248
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W3123245072
- Cited by
- 1,022
- References
- 40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.