The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Power of Incentives
Abstract
Variable pay is usually defined as pay that is tied to some measure of worker output. The most typical form of variable pay historically was the piece rate, which was more prevalent during the early part of the 20th century than it is at the beginning of the 21st. There is a resurgence in variable pay, particularly as it relates to executives, whose pay is tied to output through some mechanism like stock options or bonuses that depend on individual or firm performance. Why use variable pay? The typical reaction is that variable pay provides incentives to put forth effort. Although true, discrete-pay schemes also generate incentives. Much of the confusion in the literature results from the use of the terms high-powered and low-powered incentives, which connote difference in ability to elicit worker effort.' It is more informative to make distinctions between discrete and continuous pay and between inputbased and output-based pay.2 Pay structures can be summarized by the following equation:
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Cites
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
O'Brien, D. P., & Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230812 · Cited by 13,381
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
BAKER, G. P., JENSEN, M. C., & MURPHY, K. J. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x · Cited by 1,702
Incentive contracts and performance measurement
Baker, G. P. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261831 · Cited by 1,085
Lazear, E. P. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296345 · Cited by 708
Self-citation
Cited by
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Prendergast, C. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/341874 · Cited by 995
Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay for Performance: An Experimental Investigation
Cadsby, C. B., Song, F., & Tapon, F. (2007) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2007.24634448 · Cited by 434
Three-Way Complementarities: Performance Pay, Human Resource Analytics, and Information Technology
Aral, S., Brynjolfsson, E., & Wu, L. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1460 · Cited by 365
Flexible Wages, Bargaining, and the Gender Gap
Biasi, B., & Sarsons, H. (2021) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjab026 · Cited by 327
Teacher Effects and Teacher-Related Policies
Jackson, C. K., Rockoff, J. E., & Staiger, D. O. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-040845 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Lazear, E. P.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-05-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 410-414
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040915211
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 6.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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