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Cited by 280

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Power of Incentives

Lazear, Edward P · 2000 · American Economic Review

Abstract

Variable pay is usually defined as pay that is tied to some measure of worker output. The most typical form of variable pay historically was the piece rate, which was more prevalent during the early part of the 20th century than it is at the beginning of the 21st. There is a resurgence in variable pay, particularly as it relates to executives, whose pay is tied to output through some mechanism like stock options or bonuses that depend on individual or firm performance. Why use variable pay? The typical reaction is that variable pay provides incentives to put forth effort. Although true, discrete-pay schemes also generate incentives. Much of the confusion in the literature results from the use of the terms high-powered and low-powered incentives, which connote difference in ability to elicit worker effort.' It is more informative to make distinctions between discrete and continuous pay and between inputbased and output-based pay.2 Pay structures can be summarized by the following equation:

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Metadata

Authors
Lazear, E. P.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2000-05-01
Volume
90
Issue
2
Pages
410-414
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2040915211
Cited by
280
References
6
FWCI
6.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Power of Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.90.2.410
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Lazear, E. P. (2000). The Power of Incentives. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.410

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.