The DOI matches its Crossref record; 87 of the 87 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay for Performance: An Experimental Investigation
Abstract
Agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Using a real—effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we compared pay—for—performance and fixed—salary compensation. The former achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected pay for performance, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under it. However, more risk—averse individuals were less likely to select pay for performance and less responsive to its incentives.
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Cited by
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
Delery, J. E., & Roumpi, D. (2017) · Human Resource Management Journal · doi:10.1111/1748-8583.12137 · Cited by 526
Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives
Bridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. W. (2014) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2089 · Cited by 469
Gerhart, B., & Fang, M. (2015) · Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032414-111418 · Cited by 377
Shaw, J. D., Dineen, B. R., Fang, R., & Vellella, R. F. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.44635525 · Cited by 329
Metadata
- Authors
- Cadsby, C. B., Song, F., & Tapon, F.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 387-405
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2061006503
- Cited by
- 434
- References
- 87
- FWCI
- 46.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.