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Cited by 542

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Optimal Incentives for Teams

Che, Yeon-Koo, Yoo, Seung-Weon·2001·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/aer.91.3.525
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Abstract

Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible long-term interaction among agents, and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit, and interact with, the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents. The optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular “teams,” such as the use of low-powered, group incentives. (JEL D23, J33, J41, L23)

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Metadata

Authors
Che, Y.-K., & Yoo, S.-W.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2001-06-01
Volume
91
Issue
3
Pages
525-541
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/aer.91.3.525
OpenAlex
W2060354573
Cited by
542
References
30
FWCI
46.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Incentives for Teams. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.91.3.525
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Che, Y.-K., & Yoo, S.-W. (2001). Optimal Incentives for Teams. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.525

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.