The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Incentives for Teams
Abstract
Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible long-term interaction among agents, and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit, and interact with, the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents. The optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular “teams,” such as the use of low-powered, group incentives. (JEL D23, J33, J41, L23)
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Citations
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Cited by
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
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Metadata
- Authors
- Che, Y.-K., & Yoo, S.-W.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-06-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 525-541
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2060354573
- Cited by
- 542
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 46.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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