The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Guilt in Games
Abstract
The paper proposes to ways to capture guilt in the contexts of strategic interaction. We refer to the theoretical framework of dynamic psychological games, presented in another paper of us. Simple guilt is a dislike for letting the other down; guilt from blame is a dislike for the other's terminal belief that one has let him down. We provide conditions for equivalence of these two notions of guilt, showing by example that they are tight. We also show that every materially efficient outcome can be supported as an equilibrium if players are sufficiently sensitive to guilt. We stress the importance of players' ex post information partition.
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Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Journal of Economic Literature
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.633 · Cited by 7,468
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Guilt: An interpersonal approach
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243 · Cited by 1,884 · cited 1×
“(4) i(s ijh) = lim k!1 Pr c(sc) Q j 6=i Pr j (sj) P s0 i2S i(h) Pr c(s 0 c) Q j 6=i Pr j (s 0 j) ;”
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
Self-citationCharness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x · Cited by 1,491
Self-citationBernheim, B. D. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261957 · Cited by 1,304
Elster, J. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,166
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5 · Cited by 1,017
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
Kuhn, H. W. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-012 · Cited by 913
Cited by
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
Normative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434
The framing of games and the psychology of play
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003 · Cited by 408
Self-citationShifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility
Bartling, B., & Fischbacher, U. (2012) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr023 · Cited by 384
Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences
Lazear, E. P., Malmendier, U., & Weber, R. A. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.1.136 · Cited by 362
Metadata
- Authors
- Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-04-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 170-176
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2004752197
- Cited by
- 675
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 29.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
