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Cited by 316

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment

Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, Ozbay, Erkut Y·2007·American Economic Review

Abstract

This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)

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Metadata

Authors
Filiz-Ozbay, E., & Ozbay, E. Y.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2007-08-01
Volume
97
Issue
4
Pages
1407-1418
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1970764325
Cited by
316
References
40
FWCI
15.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.97.4.1407
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Filiz-Ozbay, E., & Ozbay, E. Y. (2007). Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1407

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.