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Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment
Abstract
This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Filiz-Ozbay, E., & Ozbay, E. Y.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-08-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1407-1418
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970764325
- Cited by
- 316
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 15.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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