The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets
Abstract
This paper examines vertical arrangements in electricity markets. Vertically integrated wholesalers, or those with long-term contracts, have less incentive to raise wholesale prices when retail prices are determined beforehand. For three restructured markets, we simulate prices that define bounds on static oligopoly equilibria. Our findings suggest that vertical arrangements dramatically affect estimated market outcomes. Had regulators impeded vertical arrangements (as in California), our simulations imply vastly higher prices than observed and production inefficiencies costing over 45 percent of those production costs with vertical arrangements. We conclude that horizontal market structure accurately predicts market performance only when accounting for vertical structure. (JEL L11, L13, L94)
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“…given by, markupit(qit) = ∣∣∣∂pit(qit) ∂qit ∣∣∣qNit , where qNit is the net quantity sold by the firm, i.e., its production minus its vertical commitments (Bushnell et al., 2008), and pit is the inverse residual demand a firm faces, i.e., it gives the resulting market clearing price if the firm…”
Rethinking real-time electricity pricing
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bushnell, J. B., Mansur, E. T., & Saravia, C.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-03-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 237-266
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124963032
- Cited by
- 443
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 26.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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