The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Spite and Development
Open accessAbstract
In a wide variety of settings, spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to cooperation, trade, and thus economic development. This paper shows that spiteful preferences - the desire to reduce another's material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one's relative payoff - are surprisingly widespread in experiments conducted in one of the least developed regions in India (Uttar Pradesh). In a one-shot trust game, the authors find that a large majority of subjects punish cooperative behavior although such punishment clearly increases inequality and decreases the payoffs of both subjects. In experiments to study coordination and to measure social preferences, the findings reveal empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another's material payoff - either for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead - is stronger among individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes. Because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a culture that stresses status-seeking, it is plausible that the observed social preference patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture. Thus, an exciting question for future research is the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or detrimental to economic development.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Munger, M. C., & North, D. C. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060065 · Cited by 24,871
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Self-citationAltruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Self-citationCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationUnderstanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Self-citationCovenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,063
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171941 · Cited by 1,169
Self-citationVan Lange, P. A. M. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.337 · Cited by 1,127
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997
Cited by
The greenness of cities: Carbon dioxide emissions and urban development
Glaeser, E. L., & Kahn, M. E. (2010) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2009.11.006 · Cited by 1,238
Natural capital and ecosystem services informing decisions: From promise to practice
Guerry, A. D., Polasky, S., Lubchenco, J., Chaplin-Kramer, R., Daily, G. C., Griffin, R., Ruckelshaus, M., Bateman, I. J., Duraiappah, A., Elmqvist, T., et al. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1503751112 · Cited by 1,017
The impact of climate change on the cost of bank loans
Javadi, S., & Masum, A.-A. (2021) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102019 · Cited by 594
On the economics of energy labels in the housing market
Brounen, D., & Kok, N. (2011) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2010.11.006 · Cited by 593
Dasgupta, P. (2008) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/s11166-008-9049-6 · Cited by 573
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Hoff, K., & Kshetramade, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-04-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 494-499
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2105098060
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 56.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Spite and Development. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.98.2.494
- The paper
- Fehr, E., Hoff, K., & Kshetramade, M. (2008). Spite and Development. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.494
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.