The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
Abstract
In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism. (JEL C78, D82, I21)
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Cited by
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
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Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Roth, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13225 · Cited by 392
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.608 · Cited by 362
Metadata
- Authors
- Erdil, A., & Ergin, H.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-05-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 669-689
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2116279087
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 39.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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