The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Stability in Supply Chain Networks
Abstract
This paper studies matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-sided markets. It gives sufficient conditions for the existence of stable networks and presents an algorithm for finding two of them. One is the best stable network for the agents on the “upstream” end of an industry. The other is best for the agents on the “downstream” end. The paper describes several properties of the set of stable networks and discusses applications of the theory to the design of matching markets with more than two types of agents and to the empirical analysis of supply chains. (JEL C78, D85, L14) The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. —Adam Smith (1776)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Hatfield, J. W., & Milgrom, P. R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825466 · Cited by 788
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Budish, E. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/664613 · Cited by 766
Bilateral Contract Networks for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading
Morstyn, T., Teytelboym, A., & Mcculloch, M. D. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2017.2786668 · Cited by 543
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Roth, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13225 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrovsky, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-05-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 897-923
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125537905
- Cited by
- 288
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 21.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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