The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India
Open accessAbstract
This paper integrates theories of political budget cycles with theories of tactical electoral redistribution to test for political capture in a novel way. Studying banks in India, I find that government-owned bank lending tracks the electoral cycle, with agricultural credit increasing by 5–10 percentage points in an election year. There is significant cross-sectional targeting, with large increases in districts in which the election is particularly close. This targeting does not occur in nonelection years or in private bank lending. I show capture is costly: elections affect loan repayment, and election-year credit booms do not measurably affect agricultural output. (JEL D72, O13, O17, Q14, Q18)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cole, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-01-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 219-250
- ISSN
- 1945-7782 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7790
- OpenAlex
- W2096027253
- Cited by
- 441
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 45.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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