The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rethinking Federalism
Open accessAbstract
The appropriate federal structure of government is now a policy issue of major debate. This paper identifies three approaches and compares their strengths and weaknesses. Economic federalism recommends the use of competitive communities for the provision of congestible local goods and a strong central government for the provision of pure public goods and spillovers. Cooperative federalism recommends intercommunity agreements; democratic federalism prefers a majority-rule representative legislature. Efficiency will sometimes conflict with other constitutional objectives--political participation and the protection of rights--and compromises will often be required.
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Citations
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Cited by
Oates, W. E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.3.1120 · Cited by 3,376
Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
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Regions, Globalization, Development
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Metadata
- Authors
- Inman, R. P., & Rubinfeld, D. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1997-11-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 43-64
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4234793579
- Cited by
- 425
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 39.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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