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Cited by 360Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsSocial and Intergroup PsychologyExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning

Epley, Nicholas, Gilovich, Thomas·2016·Journal of Economic Perspectives
DOI 10.1257/jep.30.3.133
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Abstract

Whenever we see voters explain away their preferred candidate's weaknesses, dieters assert that a couple scoops of ice cream won't really hurt their weight loss goals, or parents maintain that their children are unusually gifted, we are reminded that people's preferences can affect their beliefs. This idea is captured in the common saying, “People believe what they want to believe.” But people don't simply believe what they want to believe. Psychological research makes it clear that “motivated beliefs” are guided by motivated reasoning—reasoning in the service of some self-interest, to be sure, but reasoning nonetheless. People generally reason their way to conclusions they favor, with their preferences influencing the way evidence is gathered, arguments are processed, and memories of past experience are recalled. Each of these processes can be affected in subtle ways by people's motivations, leading to biased beliefs that feel objective. In this symposium introduction, we set the stage for discussion of motivated beliefs in the papers that follow by providing more detail about the underlying psychological processes that guide motivated reasoning.

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Metadata

Authors
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T.
Affiliations
  • Nicholas Epley is the John T. Keller Professor of Behavioral Science, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, Chicago, Illinois.
  • Cornell University (US)
ORCID
Gilovich, Thomas
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2016-08-01
Volume
30
Issue
3
Pages
133-140
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/jep.30.3.133
OpenAlex
W2479768508
Cited by
360
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 41 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 1
FWCI
17.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
motivated reasoning, motivated beliefs, belief formation, cognitive biases, evidence collection, memory retrieval, self-interest, confirmation bias

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