The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene
Abstract
How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restaurants to maintain good hygiene quality. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for good hygiene at both chain and nonchain restaurants. Despite these incentives, a policy intervention in the form of posted hygiene grade cards causes significant improvements in restaurant hygiene. (JEL I18, I19, L14, L83).
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Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
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BackgroundManagerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
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Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
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Price, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment
Jin, G. Z., & Kato, A. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00067.x · Cited by 326
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Luca, M., & Zervas, G. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2304 · Cited by 1,263
Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation
Mayzlin, D., Dover, Y., & Chevalier, J. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.8.2421 · Cited by 937
Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency
Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510533 · Cited by 752
How did increased competition affect credit ratings?
Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012 · Cited by 676
Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.Com
Luca, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1928601 · Cited by 627
How firms respond to being rated
Chatterji, A. K., & Toffel, M. W. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.840 · Cited by 547
Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Economic Insights from Internet Auctions
Bajari, P., & Hortaçsu, A. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051041409075 · Cited by 501
The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1799589 · Cited by 484
Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants
Bollinger, B., Leslie, P., & Sorensen, A. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.3.1.91 · Cited by 433
Self-citationFull Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency
Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9780521699617 · Cited by 284
The capitalization of green labels in the California housing market
Kahn, M. E., & Kok, N. (2014) · Regional Science and Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.001 · Cited by 263
Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., & McAfee, A. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2103 · Cited by 251
OECD (2010) · doi:10.1787/9789264079663-en · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Jin, G. Z., & Leslie, P.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-02-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 237-267
- ISSN
- 1945-7669 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7685
- OpenAlex
- W2025928661
- Cited by
- 222
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 20.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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