Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency Model of the Firm
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent evidence on the effect of dividend taxes on firm behavior is inconsistent with neoclassical theories of dividend and corporate taxation. We develop a simple agency model in which managers and shareholders have conflicting interests to explain the evidence. In this model, dividend taxation induces managers to undertake unproductive investments by retaining earnings, and creates a first-order deadweight cost. In contrast, corporate taxes do not distort the manager's payout decision and may only create second-order efficiency costs. Corporate income taxation may therefore be a more efficient way to generate revenue than dividend taxation, challenging existing intuitions based on neoclassical models. (JEL D21, G35, H25, H32)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 3×
“Only the large shareholders of the firm choose to monitor the firm in equilibrium (Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 1997).”
InfluentialEnjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Cited by
The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review
Saez, E., Slemrod, J., & Giertz, S. H. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.3 · Cited by 1,299
Self-citationCapital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
Yagan, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130098 · Cited by 333
Farre-Mensa, J., Michaely, R., & Schmalz, M. (2025) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109024000231 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Chetty, R., & Saez, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-08-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1-31
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W2134514875
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 36.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.