Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Online Labor Markets
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Online labor markets are Web-based platforms that enable buyers to identify and contract for information technology (IT) services with service providers using buyer-determined (BD) auctions. BD auctions in online labor markets either follow an open or a sealed bid format. We compare open and sealed bid auctions in online labor markets to identify which format is superior in terms of obtaining more bids and a higher buyer surplus. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the relative advantage of open versus sealed bid auctions hinges on the role of reducing service providers’ valuation uncertainty (difficulty in assessing the cost to execute a project) and competition uncertainty (difficulty in assessing the intensity of the competition from other service providers), which largely depend on the relative importance of the common value (versus the private value) component of the auctioned IT services, calling for an empirical investigation to compare open and sealed bid auctions. Based on a unique data set of 71,437 open bid auctions and 7,499 sealed bid auctions posted by 21,799 buyers at a leading online labor market, we find that, on average, although sealed bid auctions attract 18.4% more bids, open bid auctions offer buyers $10.87 higher surplus. Furthermore, open bid auctions are 55.3% more likely to result in a buyer’s selection of a certain service provider and 22.1% more likely to reach a contract (conditional on the buyer’s making a selection) with a provider, and they generate higher buyer satisfaction. In contrast to conventional wisdom that “the more bids the better” and industry practice of treating sealed bid auctions as a premium feature, our results suggest that the buyer surplus gained from the reduction in valuation uncertainty enabled by open bid auctions outweighs the buyer surplus gained from the higher competition uncertainty in sealed bid auctions, which renders open bid auctions a superior auction design in online labor markets.
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Citations
Cites
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“Given that the confirmation of expectations is a strong predictor of consumer satisfaction (Anderson and Sullivan 1993), we would expect open bid auctions to result in higher buyer satisfaction than sealed bid auctions.”
BackgroundDistinguishing influence-based contagion from homophily-driven diffusion in dynamic networks
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Content or Community? A Digital Business Strategy for Content Providers in the Social Age1
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Cited by
Introduction—Platforms and Infrastructures in the Digital Age
Constantinides, P., Henfridsson, O., & Parker, G. G. (2018) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2018.0794 · Cited by 943
Algorithmic Management of Work on Online Labor Platforms: When Matching Meets Control
Möhlmann, M., Zalmanson, L., Henfridsson, O., & Gregory, R. W. (2021) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2021/15333 · Cited by 554
Chen, L., Tong, T. W., Tang, S., & Han, N. (2022) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063211045023 · Cited by 345
Guo, B., & Wang, D. (2024) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/00222437231153075 · Cited by 36
On factors that moderate the effect of buyer-supplier experience on e-procurement platforms
Hong, Y., & Shao, B. B. M. (2021) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.13291 · Cited by 28
“…several key contributions to the extant operations management and information systems literature on e-procurement platforms (Gefen and Carmel 2008, Hong et al. 2016, Horton 2010, Lin et al. 2016), offshore outsourcing Carmel and Tjia 2005, Lacity and Rottman 2008), and, more broadly, distributed…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hong, Y., Wang, C. (., & Pavlou, P. A.
- Venue
- Information Systems Research
- Published
- 2016-03
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 49-69
- ISSN
- 1047-7047 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5536
- OpenAlex
- W3121697875
- Cited by
- 96
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 8.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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