The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Abstract
Many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities, products, and vendors. A scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback. Each rater merely reports a signal, and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater’s report. Honest reporting proves to be a Nash equilibrium. The scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals. We also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, N., Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1359-1373
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2109304399
- Cited by
- 506
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 32.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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