The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
Abstract
We study the problem of cooperative behavior emerging in an environment where individual behaviors and interaction structures coevolve. Players not only learn which strategy to adopt by imitating the strategy of the best-performing player they observe, but also choose with whom they should interact by selectively creating and/or severing ties with other players based on a myopic cost-benefit comparison. We find that scalable cooperation—that is, high levels of cooperation in large populations—can be achieved in sparse networks, assuming that individuals are able to sever ties unilaterally and that new ties can only be created with the mutual consent of both parties. Detailed examination shows that there is an important trade-off between local reinforcement and global expansion in achieving cooperation in dynamic networks. As a result, networks in which ties are costly and local structure is largely absent tend to generate higher levels of cooperation than those in which ties are made easily and friends of friends interact with high probability, where the latter result contrasts strongly with the usual intuition.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
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Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
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Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
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“The fact that in our model cooperators and defectors interact via social ties they both decide upon establishes a coupling between individual strategy and population structure: the game payoff induces now an entangled co-evolution of strategy and structure (for different approaches specific to the PD see [19–22], and…”
BackgroundXia, C., Wang, J., Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2023) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.002 · Cited by 339
Exploring supply chain network resilience in the presence of the ripple effect
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Self-citationEvolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hanaki, N., Peterhansl, A., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2007-07
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1036-1050
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2106668931
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 65.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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