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Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks

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Abstract

Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by natural selection only in the presence of an additional mechanism. One such mechanism is based on population structure, which can lead to clustering of cooperating agents. Recently, the focus has turned to complex dynamical population structures such as social networks, where the nodes represent individuals and links represent social relationships. We investigate how the dynamics of a social network can change the level of cooperation in the network. Individuals either update their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their social ties. For the dynamics of the network structure, a random link is selected and breaks with a probability determined by the adjacent individuals. Once it is broken, a new one is established. This linking dynamics can be conveniently characterized by a Markov chain in the configuration space of an ever-changing network of interacting agents. Our model can be analytically solved provided the dynamics of links proceeds much faster than the dynamics of strategies. This leads to a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation: The more fragile links between cooperating players and non-cooperating players are (or the more robust links between cooperators are), the more likely cooperation prevails. Our approach may pave the way for analytically investigating coevolution of strategy and structure.

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Figures

Figure 1 Linking dynamics. If the dashed link is selected in the topological evolution, it will be broken off with probability . If the dashed link is broken, then either A or B is selected to establish a new link. If A is chosen, then he switches to a random individual of the population who is not his current neighbors (B, D, E, F, G or J). Otherwise, B is chosen, then he also switches to a random individual of the population who is not his current neighbors (A, F, G, H, I or J).
Figure 1 Linking dynamics. If the dashed link is selected in the topological evolution, it will be broken off with probability . If the dashed link is broken, then either A or B is selected to establish a new link. If A is chosen, then he switches to a random individual of the population who is not his current neighbors (B, D, E, F, G or J). Otherwise, B is chosen, then he also switches to a random individual of the population who is not his current neighbors (A, F, G, H, I or J).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Final fraction of cooperators as a function of initial fraction of cooperators. The symbols indicate the simulation while the arrows represent the analytical results. Both simulation and the analytical results show that fewer cooperators can invade a population of defectors when the ties are more fragile, which validates the analytical prediction. , , , , , and for all the three lines in the plot. In addition, each data point for all the plots from Fig. (2) to Fig. (6) is averaged over independent runs. And in each run, we set the mean value over time window of generations to be the final fraction of cooperators, after a transient time of generations.
Figure 2 Final fraction of cooperators as a function of initial fraction of cooperators. The symbols indicate the simulation while the arrows represent the analytical results. Both simulation and the analytical results show that fewer cooperators can invade a population of defectors when the ties are more fragile, which validates the analytical prediction. , , , , , and for all the three lines in the plot. In addition, each data point for all the plots from Fig. (2) to Fig. (6) is averaged over independent runs. And in each run, we set the mean value over time window of generations to be the final fraction of cooperators, after a transient time of generations.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different selection pressure . It shows how the selection pressure affects the analytical prediction. The black line is our analytical condition . Initially, all the individuals are situated on a regular graph of degree and size . Each individual is assigned to be a cooperator or a defector with the same probability. All plots from Fig. (3) to Fig. (6) share the same color code and initial condition. Analytical results predict that higher cooperation level can emerge only below the black line. Simulation results show that the analytical result is more accurate for strong selection than weak selection as expected. The error is induced by the finite population size effect. (other parameters , , and ).
Figure 3 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different selection pressure . It shows how the selection pressure affects the analytical prediction. The black line is our analytical condition . Initially, all the individuals are situated on a regular graph of degree and size . Each individual is assigned to be a cooperator or a defector with the same probability. All plots from Fig. (3) to Fig. (6) share the same color code and initial condition. Analytical results predict that higher cooperation level can emerge only below the black line. Simulation results show that the analytical result is more accurate for strong selection than weak selection as expected. The error is induced by the finite population size effect. (other parameters , , and ).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of the payoff parameter . The slope of the critical line is increasing when is decreasing, indicating that cooperators are more likely to emerge when the parameter is small. (, and . )
Figure 4 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of the payoff parameter . The slope of the critical line is increasing when is decreasing, indicating that cooperators are more likely to emerge when the parameter is small. (, and . )CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of . It shows that quick partner switching between defectors, i.e., high , promotes cooperation. (, and .)
Figure 5 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of . It shows that quick partner switching between defectors, i.e., high , promotes cooperation. (, and .)CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of . Our analytical results are only valid under time scale separation, as shown in this plot. (, and )
Figure 6 Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of . Our analytical results are only valid under time scale separation, as shown in this plot. (, and )CC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Wu, B., Zhou, D., Fu, F., Luo, Q., Wang, L., & Traulsen, A.
Affiliations
  • Peking University (CN)
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology (DE)
Corresponding author
Wu, Bin
Venue
PLoS ONE
Published
2010-06-30
Volume
5
Issue
6
Pages
e11187
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2033485858
Cited by
193
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 16
FWCI
59.90
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Greater South Information System
Funders
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (60736022, 10972002)
  • China Scholarship Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
evolution of cooperation, social networks, population structure, link dynamics, strategy updating, imitation, Markov chains, network fragility
MeSH terms
Biological Evolution, Markov Chains, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior, Stochastic Processes

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1371/journal.pone.0011187
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Wu, B., Zhou, D., Fu, F., Luo, Q., Wang, L., & Traulsen, A. (2010). Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks. PLoS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0011187

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