Cited by 198Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Applications

Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating

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Wang, Jing, Suri, Siddharth, Watts, Duncan J.·2012·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

The natural tendency for humans to make and break relationships is thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. In particular, allowing conditional cooperators to choose with whom they interact is believed to reinforce the rewards accruing to mutual cooperation while simultaneously excluding defectors. Here we report on a series of human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game where, critically, they were also allowed to propose and delete links to players of their own choosing at some variable rate. Over a wide variety of parameter settings and initial conditions, we found that dynamic partner updating significantly increased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooperators. Even relatively slow update rates were sufficient to produce large effects, while subsequent increases to the update rate had progressively smaller, but still positive, effects. For standard prisoner’s dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predominantly from cooperators avoiding defectors, not by severing ties with defecting partners, and that cooperation correspondingly suffered. Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that cooperators did punish defectors by severing ties, leading to higher levels of cooperation that persisted for longer.

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  • Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation.

    “Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”

    From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [25]

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Authors
Wang, J., Suri, S., & Watts, D. J.
Affiliations
  • New York University (US)
  • Microsoft Research New York City (United States) (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2012-08-17
Volume
109
Issue
36
Pages
14363-14368
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2081896594
Cited by
198
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 1
FWCI
63.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
cooperation, assortativity, iterated prisoner's dilemma, link deletion, conditional cooperation, social punishment, human subjects research, update frequency
MeSH terms
Choice Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Reward

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