The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Strategic Consumers and Oligopolistic Competition
Abstract
We present a dynamic pricing model for oligopolistic firms selling differentiated perishable goods to multiple finite segments of strategic consumers who are aware that pricing is dynamic and may time their purchases accordingly. This model encompasses strategic behavior by both firms and consumers in a unified stochastic dynamic game in which each firm's objective is to maximize its total expected revenues, and each consumer responds according to a shopping-intensity-allocation consumer choice model. We prove the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, provide equilibrium optimality conditions, and prove monotonicity results for special cases. The model provides insights about equilibrium price dynamics under different levels of competition, asymmetry between firms, and multiple market segments with varying properties. We demonstrate that strategic behavior by consumers can have serious impacts on revenues if firms ignore that behavior in their dynamic pricing policies. Moreover, ideal equilibrium responses to consumer strategic behavior can recover only a portion of the lost revenues. A key conclusion is that firms may benefit more from limiting the information available to consumers than from allowing full information and responding to the resulting strategic behavior in an optimal fashion.
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Cites
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice
Tversky, A. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0032955 · Cited by 3,365
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management
Talluri, K. T., & Van Ryzin, G. J. (2004) · International Series in Operations Research & Management Science · doi:10.1007/b139000 · Cited by 2,243
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Shen, Z. M., & Su, X. (2007) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00291.x · Cited by 337
Are Consumers Strategic? Structural Estimation from the Air-Travel Industry
Li, J., Granados, N., & Netessine, S. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1860 · Cited by 281
Strategic consumer behavior in online hotel booking
Masiero, L., Viglia, G., & Nieto-Garcia, M. (2020) · Annals of Tourism Research · doi:10.1016/j.annals.2020.102947 · Cited by 70
Consumer perception of price fairness and dynamic pricing: Evidence from Booking.com
Alderighi, M., Nava, C. R., Calabrese, M., Christille, J.-M., & Salvemini, C. B. (2022) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.03.017 · Cited by 63
Metadata
- Authors
- Levin, Y., McGill, J., & Nediak, M.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 32-46
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2147037594
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 18.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Levin, Y., McGill, J., & Nediak, M. (2009). Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Strategic Consumers and Oligopolistic Competition. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0936
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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