The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the Financing Benefits of Supply Chain Transparency and Blockchain Adoption
Abstract
We develop a theory that shows signaling a firm’s fundamental quality (e.g., its operational capabilities) to lenders through inventory transactions to be more efficient—it leads to less costly operational distortions—than signaling through loan requests, and we characterize how the efficiency gains depend on firm operational characteristics, such as operating costs, market size, and inventory salvage value. Signaling through inventory being only tenable when inventory transactions are verifiable at low enough cost, we then turn our attention to how this verifiability can be achieved in practice and argue that blockchain technology could enable it more efficiently than traditional monitoring mechanisms. To demonstrate, we develop b_verify, an open-source blockchain protocol that leverages Bitcoin to provide supply chain transparency at scale and in a cost-effective way. The paper identifies an important benefit of blockchain adoption—by opening a window of transparency into a firm’s supply chain, blockchain technology furnishes the ability to secure favorable financing terms at lower signaling costs. Furthermore, the analysis of the preferred signaling mode sheds light on what types of firms or supply chains would stand to benefit the most from this use of blockchain technology. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.
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Citations
Cites
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Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168 · cited 2×
“Signaling to financiers/suppliers Signaling through loan requests to financiers has been well studied in the finance literature, going back to Ross (1977) who shows that high-quality firms, concerned with short-term valuation, can signal to investors by requesting larger loans.”
Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt
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Trade credit and credit rationing
Biais, B., & Gollier, C. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.4.903 · Cited by 982 · cited 2×
“Section 2.2 deals with the cash signaling game that ensues when the lender does not 6Fairly priced credit is a standard assumption in the finance literature (see e.g., Biais and Gollier 1997 and Burkart and Ellingsen 2004).”
InfluentialIn-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit
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Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?
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Cited by
Disruptive Technologies and Operations Management in the Industry 4.0 Era and Beyond
Choi, T., Kumar, S., Yue, X., & Chan, H. (2022) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.13622 · Cited by 655
Leng, J., Ruan, G., Jiang, P., Xu, K., Liu, Q., Zhou, X., & Liu, C. (2020) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2020.110112 · Cited by 506
Supply Chain Finance Innovation Using Blockchain
Du, M., Chen, Q., Xiao, J., Yang, H., & Ma, X. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management · doi:10.1109/tem.2020.2971858 · Cited by 418
A framework of blockchain technology adoption: An investigation of challenges and expected value
Toufaily, E., Zalan, T., & Dhaou, S. B. (2021) · Information & Management · doi:10.1016/j.im.2021.103444 · Cited by 393
Application of digital technologies for ensuring agricultural productivity
Abiri, R., Rizan, N., Balasundram, S. K., Shahbazi, A. B., & Abdul-Hamid, H. (2023) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e22601 · Cited by 334
Traceability vs. sustainability in supply chains: The implications of blockchain
Biswas, D., Jalali, H., Ansaripoor, A. H., & De Giovanni, P. (2023) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.034 · Cited by 321
Khan, S. A. R., Godil, D. I., Jabbour, C. J. C., Shujaat, S., Razzaq, A., & Yu, Z. (2025) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-021-04275-x · Cited by 283
Risk analysis in logistics systems: A research agenda during and after the COVID-19 pandemic
Choi, T.-M. (2021) · Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review · doi:10.1016/j.tre.2020.102190 · Cited by 259
Platform Tokenization: Financing, Governance, and Moral Hazard
Chod, J., Trichakis, N., & Yang, S. A. (2022) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4225 · Cited by 134
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Chod, J., Trichakis, N., Tsoukalas, G., Aspegren, H., & Weber, M.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2020-10
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 4378-4396
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2789981453
- Cited by
- 654
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 86.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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