The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Decision Making Over Time and Under Uncertainty: A Common Approach
Abstract
This paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice. We begin by demonstrating a one-to-one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains (i.e., expected utility and discounted utility models). We argue that such violations (or preference reversals) are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice. Specifically, it appears that: (1) if we add a constant to all values of an attribute, then that attribute becomes less important; (2) if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute, or if we change the sign of an attribute, from positive to negative, then that attribute becomes more important. The generality of these propositions, as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences, is discussed.
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Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
A theory of anticipated utility
Quiggin, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7 · Cited by 3,129
The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
Yaari, M. E. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911158 · Cited by 2,419
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation
Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118482 · Cited by 2,305
Self-citationSome empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency
Thaler, R. (1981) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7 · Cited by 2,243
Markowitz, H. (1952) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257177 · Cited by 1,771
Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.371 · Cited by 1,567
Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience
Koopmans, T. C. (1960) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907722 · Cited by 1,532
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND DELAY
Rachlin, H., Raineri, A., & Cross, D. (1991) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1991.55-233 · Cited by 1,341
Cited by
The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation.
Loewenstein, G. (1994) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.75 · Cited by 2,738
Self-citationA Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.
Green, L., & Myerson, J. (2004) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.5.769 · Cited by 1,676
Neuronal Reward and Decision Signals: From Theories to Data
Schultz, W. (2015) · Physiological Reviews · doi:10.1152/physrev.00023.2014 · Cited by 1,126
Dopamine reward prediction-error signalling: A two-component response
Schultz, W. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2015.26 · Cited by 1,036
Laverty, K. J. (1996) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1996.9702100316 · Cited by 690
Metadata
- Authors
- Prelec, D., & Loewenstein, G.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1991-07
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 770-786
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2120505991
- Cited by
- 594
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 2.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
