The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.
Abstract
Abstract : Preference can be inferred from direct choice between options or from a matching procedure in which the decision maker adjusts one option to match another. Studies of perferences between two-dimensional options (e.g., public policies, job applicants, benefit plans) show that the more prominent dimension looms larger in choice than in matching. Thus, choice is more lexicographic than matching. This finding is viewed as an instance of a general principle of compatibility: the weighting of input is enhanced by their compatibility with the output. To account for such effects, we develop a hierarchy of models in which the tradeoff between attributes is contingent on the nature of the response. The simplest theory of this type, called the contingent weighting model, is applied to the analysis of various compatibility effects, including the choice-matching discrepancy and the preference-reversal phenomenon. These results raise both conceptual and practical questions concerning the nature, the meaning and the assessment of preference.
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Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Self-citationRegret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
S-R compatibility: spatial characteristics of stimulus and response codes.
Fitts, P. M., & Seeger, C. M. (1953) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0062827 · Cited by 1,088
Cited by
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Self-citationLoss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Liberman, N., & Yaacov Trope, B. (1998) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.75.1.5 · Cited by 2,366
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 371-384
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2016794508
- Cited by
- 1,567
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 17.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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