The Impact of CEO Status Diffusion on the Economic Outcomes of Other Senior Managers
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper we develop and test predictions regarding the impact of CEO status on the economic outcomes of top management team members. Using a unique data set incorporating Financial World's widely publicized CEO of the Year contest, we found that non-CEO top management team members received higher pay when they worked for a high-status CEO. However, star CEOs themselves retained most of the compensation benefits. We also show that there is a “burden of celebrity” in that the above relationships were contingent on how well a firm performs. Last, we found that, when compared with the subordinates of less-celebrated CEOs, members of top management teams who worked for star CEOs were more likely to become CEOs themselves through internal or external promotions.
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Cites
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338 · cited 5×
“Agency theory also recognizes that it is difficult to write outcome-based contracts when there are both joint production and uncertainty regarding the link between specific managerial behaviors and firm outcomes (Eisenhardt 1989).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe Matthew Effect in Science: The reward and communication systems of science are considered.
Merton, R. K. (1968) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.159.3810.56 · Cited by 6,720 · cited 1×
“…returns to quality” are counterintuitive and potentially theoretically important, given that the existing literature on the effects of status in and around organizations has tended to emphasize the positive returns to quality that accrue to high-status actors (e.g., Merton 1968, Podolny 2005).”
Interorganizational Endorsements and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures
Stuart, T. E., Hoang, H., & Hybels, R. C. (1999) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2666998 · Cited by 2,751
Peterson, R. S., Smith, D. B., Martorana, P. V., & Owens, P. D. (2003) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.795 · Cited by 654 · cited 1×
“These characteristics include CEO management style (Guest 1962), the fit between CEO characteristics and industry conditions (Datta and Rajagopalan 1998), CEO personality (Peterson et al. 2003), and CEO charisma (Flynn and Staw 2004).”
Background
Cited by
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2011) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839211427534 · Cited by 636
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments
Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206307308588 · Cited by 544
Piezunka, H., & Dahlander, L. (2015) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0458 · Cited by 497
Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic
Carlos, W. C., & Lewis, B. W. (2018) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839217695089 · Cited by 393
New Directions in Corporate Governance Research
Hambrick, D. C., Werder, A. V., & Zajac, E. J. (2008) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1080.0361 · Cited by 387
Metadata
- Authors
- Graffin, S. D., Wade, J. B., Porac, J. F., & McNamee, R. C.
- Venue
- Organization Science
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 457-474
- ISSN
- 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5455
- OpenAlex
- W2143750964
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 9.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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