The DOI matches its Crossref record; 120 of the 120 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments
Abstract
The failure to document a consistent and robust relationship between executive pay and firm performance has frustrated scholars and practitioners for over three quarters of a century. Although recent compensation research has revealed alternative theoretical frameworks and findings that hold the potential to significantly improve our understanding of executive compensation, to date this diverse literature lacks theoretical integration. Accordingly, we develop a framework to organize and review these recent findings. We further identify methodological issues and concerns, discuss the implications of these concerns, and provide recommendations for future research aimed at developing a more integrated research agenda.
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Cites
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Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.2010.55.1.82 · Cited by 1,830
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Metadata
- Authors
- Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1016-1072
- ISSN
- 0149-2063 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-1211
- OpenAlex
- W2118419282
- Cited by
- 544
- References
- 120
- FWCI
- 78.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007). Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments. Journal of Management. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206307308588
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.