The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for the Health Professions
Abstract
Virtue is the most perdurable concept in the history of ethics, which is understandable given the ineradicability of the moral agent in the events of the moral life. Historically, virtue enjoyed normative force as long as the philosophical anthropology and the metaphysics of the good that grounded virtue were viable. That grounding has eroded in both general and medical ethics. If virtue is to be restored to a normative status, its philosophical underpinnings must be reconstructed. Such reconstruction seems unlikely in general ethics, where the possibility of agreement on the good for humans is remote. However, it is a realistic possibility in the professional ethics of the health professions where agreement on the telos of the healing relationship is more likely to arise. Nevertheless, virtue-based ethics must be related conceptually and normatively to other ethical theories in a comprehensive moral philosophy of the health professions.
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Cites
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Cited by
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
Greco, J. (2003) · Intellectual Virtue · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006 · Cited by 360
Principlism and Its Alleged Competitors
Beauchamp, T. L. (1995) · Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal · doi:10.1353/ken.0.0111 · Cited by 147
Citizenship and Social Responsibility in Surgery: A Review
Janeway, M., Wilson, S., Sanchez, S. E., Arora, T. K., & Dechert, T. (2022) · JAMA Surgery · doi:10.1001/jamasurg.2022.0621 · Cited by 31
The situationist critique of virtue ethics
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pellegrino, E. D.
- Venue
- Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1995-09
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 253-277
- ISSN
- 1054-6863 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3249
- OpenAlex
- W2088077647
- Cited by
- 294
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 6.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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