The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Did Government Decentralization Cause China's Economic Miracle?
Abstract
Many scholars attribute China's market reforms and the remarkable economic performance they have fostered in part to the country's political and fiscal decentralization. Political decentralization is said to have stimulated local policy experiments and restrained predatory central interventions. Fiscal decentralization is thought to have motivated local officials to promote development and harden enterprises' budget constraints. The locally diversified structure of the prereform economy is said to have facilitated liberalization. Reexamining these arguments, the authors find that none establishes a convincing link between political or fiscal decentralization and China's successes. They suggest an alternative view of the reform process in which growth-enhancing policies emerged from competition between promarket and conservative factions in Beijing.
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Cites
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Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
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China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience
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The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China
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Cited by
Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise
Heilmann, S. (2008) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-007-9014-4 · Cited by 740
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder
Landry, P. F., Lü, X., & Duan, H. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414017730078 · Cited by 427
China's Local Political Budget Cycles
Guo, G. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00390.x · Cited by 417
Jiang, J. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12394 · Cited by 413
Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China
LÜ, X., & LANDRY, P. F. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000252 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Cai, H., & Treisman, D.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2006-07
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 505-535
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2124536339
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 18.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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