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Neural Substrates for Judgment of Self-Agency in Ambiguous Situations
Open accessAbstract
The sense of agency is the attribution of oneself as the cause of one's own actions and their effects. Accurate agency judgments are essential for adaptive behaviors in dynamic environments, especially in conditions of uncertainty. However, it is unclear how agency judgments are made in ambiguous situations where self-agency and non-self-agency are both possible. Agency attribution is thus thought to require higher-order neurocognitive processes that integrate several possibilities. Furthermore, neural activity specific to self-attribution, as compared with non-self-attribution, may reflect higher-order critical operations that contribute to constructions of self-consciousness. Based on these assumptions, the present study focused on agency judgments under ambiguous conditions and examined the neural correlates of this operation with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Participants performed a simple but demanding agency-judgment task, which required them to report on whether they attributed their own action as the cause of a visual stimulus change. The temporal discrepancy between the participant's action and the visual events was adaptively set to be maximally ambiguous for each individual on a trial-by-trial basis. Comparison with results for a control condition revealed that the judgment of agency was associated with activity in lateral temporo-parietal areas, medial frontal areas, the dorsolateral prefrontal area, and frontal operculum/insula regions. However, most of these areas did not differentiate between self- and non-self-attribution. Instead, self-attribution was associated with activity in posterior midline areas, including the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest that deliberate self-attribution of an external event is principally associated with activity in posterior midline structures, which is imperative for self-consciousness.
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Cites
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
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“The ‘‘sense of agency’’, an essential aspect of self-recognition, refers to the self-attribution of the cause of one’s own action, and its effects on the outside world [1–4].”
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Precuneus shares intrinsic functional architecture in humans and monkeys
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“Although previous findings are not entirely consistent, several functional connectivity studies have reported that medial posterior areas are associated with regions thought to be involved in agency, such as the TPJ/IPL, insula, and SMA [45].”
BackgroundResultExecutive Function: The Search for an Integrated Account
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“Along another line, it is important to distinguish agency attribution from action monitoring, which is considered to be associated with PFC activity [49].”
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Background
Cited by
Neural correlates of sense of agency in motor control: a neuroimaging meta-analysis
Zito, G. A., Wiest, R., & Aybek, S. (2020) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0234321 · Cited by 79
“Neuroimaging studies have mainly focused on the feeling of agency, and have found that the SoA involves areas devoted to the motor system (ventral premotor cortex [26, 27], supplementary motor areas–SMA [20, 26, 28–31] and pre-SMA [21, 31–37]–cerebellum [20, 26, 28, 30–32, 34, 37–41]), as well as to cognition and mult…”
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Loeffler, L. A. K., Radke, S., Habel, U., Ciric, R., Satterthwaite, T. D., Schneider, F., & Derntl, B. (2018) · NeuroImage: Clinical · doi:10.1016/j.nicl.2018.10.025 · Cited by 47
A systematic review and meta-analysis on the neural correlates of bodily self-consciousness
Brunello, N., Diana, L., Sritharan, J., Glisic, M., Nef, T., Verma, R. K., & Zito, G. A. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106420 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Fukushima, H., Goto, Y., Maeda, T., Kato, M., & Umeda, S.
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2013-08-19
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- e72267
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965635256
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 1.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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