CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 68Free Will and AgencyNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesMotor Control and Adaptation

The brain in (Willed) action: a meta-analytical comparison of imaging studies on motor intentionality and sense of agency

Open access
Seghezzi, Silvia, Zirone, Eleonora, Paulesu, Eraldo, Zapparoli, Laura·2019·Frontiers in Psychology
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00804PMC PMC6473038
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

Voluntary actions can be fractionated in different phenomena: from the emergence of intentions and the ensuing motor plans and actions, to the anticipation and monitoring of their outcomes, to the appreciation of their congruency with intentions and to the eventual emergence of a sense of agency. It follows that motor intention and the sense of agency should occur at different stages in the normal generation of willed actions. Both these processes have been associated with a fronto-parietal motor network, but no study has investigated to what extent the two experiences can be dissociated for the brain regions involved. To this end, we assessed the PET/fMRI literature on agency and intentionality using a meta-analytic technique based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Beside a shared brain network involving the meso-frontal and prefrontal regions, the middle insula and subcortical structures, we found that motor intention and the sense of agency are functionally underpinned by separable sets of brain regions: an "intentionality network," involving the rostral area of the mesial frontal cortex (middle cingulum and pre-supplementary motor area), the anterior insula and the parietal lobules, and a "self-agency network," which involves the posterior areas of the mesial frontal cortex (the SMA proper), the posterior insula, the occipital lobe and the cerebellum. We were then able to confirm this functional organization by a subsequent seed-based fMRI resting-state functional connectivity analysis, with seeds derived from the intentionality/sense of agency specific clusters of the medial wall of the frontal lobe. Our results suggest the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the mesial frontal cortex, with the more anterior regions linked to the concept of motor intentionality and the brain areas located more posteriorly associated with the direct monitoring between the action and its outcome. This suggestion is reinforced by the association between the sense of agency and the activation of the occipital lobes, to suggest a direct comparison between the movement and its external (e.g., visual) consequences. The shared network may be important for the integration of intentionality and agency in a coherent appreciation of self-generated actions.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00804

Cites

3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • The network activated when agency is disrupted consistently involves the temporo-parietal junction or inferior parietal lobule, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus, the pre-supplementary motor area, the superior and middle temporal gyrus, and the angular gyrus.

    “The network that is activated when the agency is disrupted consistently involves the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) or inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus, the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA), the superior and middle temporal gyrus, the angular gyrus (Sperduti et al., 2011; Seghezzi et al., 2019; Zito et al., 2020).”

    From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Seghezzi et al., 2019

    The Explorative Meta-Analysis (page unavailable) assigns the inferior parietal lobule and pre-SMA to motor intention, not specifically to self-agency. It identifies SMA proper, posterior insula, calcarine fissure and cerebellum as self-agency-specific clusters. The paper does not describe the claimed list as a network consistently activated when agency is disrupted. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Positive self-agency has been associated with the insula, the primary somatosensory cortex, the premotor cortex, the SMA, the calcarine sulcus, and the cerebellum.

    “By contrast, the “positive” self-agency has been associated with the insula, the primary somatosensory cortex, the premotor cortex, the SMA, the calcarine sulcus, the cerebellum (Sperduti et al., 2011; Seghezzi et al., 2019).”

    From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Seghezzi et al., 2019

    The Explorative Meta-Analysis results identify the SMA, posterior insula, calcarine fissure, and cerebellum as self-agency-specific clusters. The Discussion also includes premotor areas in a network shared with motor intention, while the Confirmative Analysis reports connectivity between the agency-associated SMA and the postcentral gyrus. The paper does not distinguish “positive” self-agency, and it does not identify the primary somatosensory cortex or premotor cortex as self-agency-specific clusters. The supplied passages have section labels but no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Different measures of the sense of agency-explicit judgment of agency, non-agency, and intentional binding-have been associated with different brain regions.

    “As stressed in the previous paragraph, the different measures of the sense of agency (explicit judgment of the agency, “non-agency” and intentional binding) have been associated with different brain regions, that have been recently reviewed in meta-analyzes (Sperduti et al., 2011; Seghezzi et al., 2019; Zito et al., 2020).”

    From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Seghezzi et al., 2019

    The Introduction distinguishes explicit judgments of agency from implicit measures such as intentional binding. The Explorative Meta-Analysis reports brain-region clusters for self-agency and external-agency, but the passages do not report a distinct brain-region association for intentional binding. Thus this paper supports only part of the three-measure claim. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The cerebellum is involved in detecting a mismatch between the expected and actual sensory feedback, leading to a feeling of disrupted agency.

    “Second, as shown in the previous section, the cerebellum is involved in detecting a mismatch between the expected and actual sensory feedback, leading to a feeling of disrupted agency (Blakemore et al., 2001; Nahab et al., 2011; Seghezzi et al., 2019).”

    From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Seghezzi et al., 2019

    The Introduction’s comparator-model section says that a mismatch between predicted and actual outcomes prevents an outcome from being attributed to one’s own action. The Explorative Meta-Analysis links the right cerebellum to self-agency, but our copy does not identify the cerebellum specifically as the detector of that mismatch. Page numbers are not available in the indexed passages. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 64

  1. Aarts H. Custers R. Wegner D. M. (2005). On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. Consc. Cogn. 14 439– 458. 10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001 16091264 · DOI
  2. Berlucchi G. Vallar G. (2018). The history of the neurophysiology and neurology of the parietal lobe. Handb. Clin. Neurol. 151 3– 30. 10.1016/B978-0-444-63622-5.00001-2 29519464 · DOI
  3. Blakemore S. J. Frith C. (2003). Self-awareness and action. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 13 219– 224. 10.1016/S0959-4388(03)00043-6 12744977 · DOI
  4. Blakemore S. J. Wolpert D. M. Frith C. D. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends Cogn. Sci. 6 237– 242. 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01907-1 12039604 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Brass M. Haggard P. (2007). To do or not to do: the neural signature of self-control. J. Neurosci. 27 9141– 9145. 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0924-07.2007 17715350 PMC6672190 · DOI
  6. Bush G. Luu P. Posner M. I. (2000). Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior cingulate cortex. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4 215– 222. 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01483-2 10827444 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Cattinelli I. Valentini G. Paulesu E. Borghese N. A. (2013). A novel approach to the problem of non-uniqueness of the solution in hierarchical clustering. IEEE Trans. Neural Netw. Learn. Syst. 24 1166– 1173. 10.1109/TNNLS.2013.2247058 24808531 · DOI
  8. Cauda F. D’Agata F. Sacco K. Duca S. Geminiani G. Vercelli A. (2011). Functional connectivity of the insula in the resting brain. Neuroimage 55 8– 23. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.049 21111053 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Daprati E. Wriessnegger S. Lacquaniti F. (2007). Kinematic cues and recognition of self-generated actions. Exp. Brain Res. 177 31– 44. 10.1007/s00221-006-0646-9 16924486 · DOI
  10. De Baene W. Brass M. (2013). Switch probability context (in)sensitivity within the cognitive control network. Neuroimage 77 207– 214. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.03.057 23567890 · DOI
  11. Devinsky O. Morrell M. J. Vogt B. A. (1995). Contributions of anterior cingulate cortex to behaviour. Brain 118(Pt 1), 279– 306. 10.1093/brain/118.1.279 7895011 · DOI · Paper page
  12. Dupont S. Bouilleret V. Hasboun D. Semah F. Baulac M. (2003). Functional anatomy of the insula: new insights from imaging. Surg. Radiol. Anat. 25 113– 119. 10.1007/s00276-003-0103-4 12819943 · DOI
  13. Eickhoff S. B. Laird A. R. Grefkes C. Wang L. E. Zilles K. Fox P. T. (2009). Coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of neuroimaging data: a random-effects approach based on empirical estimates of spatial uncertainty. Hum. Brain Mapp. 30 2907– 2926. 10.1002/hbm.20718 19172646 PMC2872071 · DOI · Paper page
  14. Farrer C. Frey S. H. Van Horn J. D. Tunik E. Turk D. Inati S. (2008). The angular gyrus computes action awareness representations. Cereb. Cortex 18 254– 261. 10.1093/cercor/bhm050 17490989 · DOI
  15. Farrer C. Frith C. D. (2002). Experiencing oneself vs another person as being the cause of an action: the neural correlates of the experience of agency. Neuroimage 15 596– 603. 10.1006/nimg.2001.1009 11848702 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Flandin G. Friston K. J. (2017). Analysis of family-wise error rates in statistical parametric mapping using random field theory. Hum. Brain Mapp. 10.1002/hbm.23839 [Epub ahead of print]. 29091338 PMC6585687 · DOI
  17. Forstmann B. U. Brass M. Koch I. von Cramon D. Y. (2006). Voluntary selection of task sets revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 18 388– 398. 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.3.388 16513004 · DOI
  18. Frith C. D. (1987). The positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia reflect impairments in the perception and initiation of action. Psychol. Med. 17 631– 648. 10.1017/S0033291700025873 3628624 · DOI · Paper page
  19. Frith C. D. Blakemore S. J. Wolpert D. M. (2000). Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 355 1771– 1788. 10.1098/rstb.2000.0734 11205340 PMC1692910 · DOI
  20. Frith C. D. Friston K. Liddle P. F. Frackowiak R. S. (1991). Willed action and the prefrontal cortex in man: a study with PET. Proc. Biol. Sci. 244 241– 246. 10.1098/rspb.1991.0077 1679944 · DOI
  21. Fukushima H. Goto Y. Maeda T. Kato M. Umeda S. (2013). Neural substrates for judgment of self-agency in ambiguous situations. PLoS One 8: e72267. 10.1371/journal.pone.0072267 23977268 PMC3747082 · DOI
  22. Gazzaniga M. S. (1998). The Mind’s Past. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
  23. Haggard P. (2005). Conscious intention and motor cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9 290– 295. 10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.012 15925808 · DOI · Paper page
  24. Haggard P. (2008). Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9 934– 946. 10.1038/nrn2497 19020512 · DOI · Paper page
  25. Haggard P. (2017). Sense of agency in the human brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 18 196– 207. 10.1038/nrn.2017.14 28251993 · DOI · Paper page
  26. Haggard P. Clark S. (2003). Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction. Consc. Cogn. 12 695– 707. 10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00052-7 14656511 · DOI
  27. Haggard P. Clark S. Kalogeras J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nat. Neurosci. 5 382– 385. 10.1038/nn827 11896397 · DOI · Paper page
  28. He S. Q. Dum R. P. Strick P. L. (1995). Topographic organization of corticospinal projections from the frontal lobe: motor areas on the medial surface of the hemisphere. J. Neurosci. 15 3284– 3306. 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.15-05-03284.1995 7538558 PMC6578253 · DOI
  29. Horwitz B. (2003). The elusive concept of brain connectivity. Neuroimage 19 466– 470. 10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00112-5 12814595 · DOI · Paper page
  30. Jenkins I. H. Jahanshahi M. Jueptner M. Passingham R. E. Brooks D. J. (2000). Self-initiated versus externally triggered movements. II The effect of movement predictability on regional cerebral blood flow. Brain 123(Pt 6), 1216– 1228. 10.1093/brain/123.6.1216 10825359 · DOI
  31. Kim J. H. Lee J. M. Jo H. J. Kim S. H. Lee J. H. Kim S. T. (2010). Defining functional SMA and pre-SMA subregions in human MFC using resting state fMRI: functional connectivity-based parcellation method. Neuroimage 49 2375– 2386. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.10.016 19837176 PMC2819173 · DOI
  32. Krieghoff V. Brass M. Prinz W. Waszak F. (2009). Dissociating what and when of intentional actions. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 3: 3. 10.3389/neuro.09.003.2009 19277217 PMC2654019 · DOI
  33. Krieghoff V. Waszak F. Prinz W. Brass M. (2011). Neural and behavioral correlates of intentional actions. Neuropsychologia 49 767– 776. 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.01.025 21255591 · DOI
  34. Kühn S. Brass M. Haggard P. (2013). Feeling in control: Neural correlates of experience of agency. Cortex 49 1935– 1942. 10.1016/j.cortex.2012.09.002 23067726 · DOI
  35. Kurth F. Eickhoff S. B. Schleicher A. Hoemke L. Zilles K. Amunts K. (2010). Cytoarchitecture and probabilistic maps of the human posterior insular cortex. Cereb. Cortex 20 1448– 1461. 10.1093/cercor/bhp208 19822572 PMC2871375 · DOI
  36. Lau H. C. Rogers R. D. Ramnani N. Passingham R. E. (2004b). Willed action and attention to the selection of action. Neuroimage 21 1407– 1415. 15050566
  37. Libet B. Gleason C. A. Wright E. W. Pearl D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106(Pt 3), 623– 642. 10.1093/brain/106.3.623 6640273 · DOI · Paper page
  38. Matsuzawa M. Matsuo K. Sugio T. Kato C. Nakai T. (2005). Temporal relationship between action and visual outcome modulates brain activation: an fMRI study. Magn. Reson. Med. Sci. 4 115– 121. 10.2463/mrms.4.115 16462131 · DOI
  39. Mayer J. S. Bittner R. A. Nikoli D. ć Bledowski C. Goebel R. Linden D. E. (2007). Common neural substrates for visual working memory and attention. Neuroimage 36 441– 453. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.03.007 17462914 · DOI
  40. Moore J. W. Obhi S. S. (2012). Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a review. Consc. Cogn 21 546– 561. 10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002 22240158 · DOI
  41. Murray R. J. Schaer M. Debban M. (2012). Degrees of separation: a quantitative neuroimaging meta-analysis investigating self-specificity and shared neural activation between self- and other-reflection. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36 1043– 1059. 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.013 22230705 · DOI
  42. Nachev P. Kennard C. Husain M. (2008). Functional role of the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9 856– 869. 10.1038/nrn2478 18843271 · DOI · Paper page
  43. Nachev P. Wydell H. O’neill K. Husain M. Kennard C. (2007). The role of the pre-supplementary motor area in the control of action. Neuroimage 36(Suppl. 2), T155– T163. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.03.034 17499162 PMC2648723 · DOI
  44. Oldfield R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: the edinburgh inventory. Neuropsychologia 9 97– 113. 10.1016/0028-3932(71)90067-4 5146491 · DOI · Paper page
  45. Pacherie E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework. Cognition 107 179– 217. 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003 17950720 · DOI · Paper page
  46. Passingham R. E. Bengtsson S. L. Lau H. C. (2010). Medial frontal cortex: from self-generated action to reflection on one’s own performance. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14 16– 21. 10.1016/j.tics.2009.11.001 19969501 PMC2806969 · DOI · Paper page
  47. Passingham R. E. Lau H. C. (2017). Acting, seeing, and conscious awareness. Neuropsychologia 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.06.012 [Epub ahead of print]. 28623108 · DOI
  48. Paulesu E. Danelli L. Berlingeri M. (2014). Reading the dyslexic brain: multiple dysfunctional routes revealed by a new meta-analysis of PET and fMRI activation studies. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8: 830. 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00830 25426043 PMC4227573 · DOI
  49. Renes R. A. van Haren N. E. Aarts H. Vink M. (2015). An exploratory fMRI study into inferences of self-agency. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 10 708– 712. 10.1093/scan/nsu106 25170021 PMC4420747 · DOI
  50. Rorden C. Brett M. (2000). Stereotaxic display of brain lesions. Behav. Neurol. 12 191– 200. 10.1155/2000/421719 11568431 · DOI
  51. Schnell K. Heekeren K. Schnitker R. Daumann J. Weber J. Hesselmann V. (2007). An fMRI approach to particularize the frontoparietal network for visuomotor action monitoring: detection of incongruence between test subjects’ actions and resulting perceptions. Neuroimage 34 332– 341. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.08.027 17046287 · DOI
  52. Showers M. J. Lauer E. W. (1961). Somatovisceral motor patterns in the insula. J. Comp. Neurol. 117 107– 115. 10.1002/cne.901170109 13912292 · DOI
  53. Synofzik M. Vosgerau G. Newen A. (2008a). Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. Conscious Cogn. 17 219– 239. 17482480
  54. Synofzik M. Vosgerau G. Newen A. (2008b). I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. Conscious Cogn. 17 411– 424. 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.008 18411059 · DOI
  55. Tsakiris M. Longo M. R. Haggard P. (2010). Having a body versus moving your body: neural signatures of agency and body-ownership. Neuropsychologia 48 2740– 2749. 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.021 20510255 · DOI · Paper page
  56. Turkeltaub P. E. Eickhoff S. B. Laird A. R. Fox M. Wiener M. Fox P. (2012). Minimizing within-experiment and within-group effects in activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses. Hum. Brain Mapp. 33 1– 13. 10.1002/hbm.21186 21305667 PMC4791073 · DOI
  57. Ward J. H. (1963). Hierarchical Grouping to optimize an objective function. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 58 236– 244. 10.1080/01621459.1963.10500845 · DOI
  58. Wegner D. M. (2003). The mind’s best trick: how we experience conscious will. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7 65– 69. 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00002-0 12584024 · DOI · Paper page
  59. Wegner D. M. Wheatley T. (1999). Apparent mental causation. sources of the experience of will. Am. Psychol. 54 480– 492. 10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480 10424155 · DOI
  60. Wisniewski D. Goschke T. Haynes J. D. (2016). Similar coding of freely chosen and externally cued intentions in a fronto-parietal network. Neuroimage 134 450– 458. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.04.044 27107470 · DOI
  61. Wolpert D. M. (1997). Computational approaches to motor control. Trends Cogn. Sci. 1 209– 216. 10.1016/S1364-6613(97)01070-X 21223909 · DOI
  62. Wolpert D. M. Ghahramani Z. (2000). Computational principles of movement neuroscience. Nat. Neurosci. 3(Suppl.), 1212– 1217. 10.1038/81497 11127840 · DOI · Paper page
  63. Zapparoli L. Seghezzi S. Paulesu E. (2017). The what, the when, and the whether of intentional action in the brain: a meta-analytical review. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 11: 238. 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00238 28567010 PMC5434171 · DOI
  64. Zapparoli L. Seghezzi S. Scifo P. Zerbi A. Banfi G. Tettamanti M. (2018). Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 115 7440– 7445. 10.1073/pnas.1718891115 29950316 PMC6048480 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Seghezzi, S., Zirone, E., Paulesu, E., & Zapparoli, L.
Affiliations
  • University of Milano-Bicocca (IT)
  • IRCCS Ospedale Galeazzi - Sant'Ambrogio (IT)
Corresponding author
Zapparoli, Laura
ORCID
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2019-04-12
Volume
10
Pages
804-804
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00804
PMC
PMC6473038
OpenAlex
W2937117144
Cited by
68
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 2
FWCI
4.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • BOA (University of Milano-Bicocca) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Ministero della Salute (Ricerca Corrente; Project L3025, L3025)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
Keywords
motor intentionality, sense of agency, voluntary action, pre-supplementary motor area, supplementary motor area, anterior insula, posterior insula, parietal lobule, cerebellum, occipital lobe, resting-state functional connectivity, rostrocaudal gradient, self-generated action

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review