Cited by 83Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentSocial and Intergroup PsychologyDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Moralized rationality: Relying on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of belief can be seen as a moral issue

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Ståhl, Tomas, Zaal, Maarten P., Skitka, Linda J.·2016·PLOS ONE

Abstract

In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. Eight studies are reported in which an instrument to measure individual differences in moralized rationality is validated. Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1-3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5). We further demonstrate that the MRS predicts morally laden reactions, such as a desire for punishment, of people who rely on irrational (vs. rational) ways of forming and evaluating beliefs (Studies 6 and 7). Finally, we show that the MRS uniquely predicts motivation to contribute to a charity that works to prevent the spread of irrational beliefs (Study 8). We conclude that (1) there are stable individual differences in the extent to which people moralize a reliance on rationality in the formation and evaluation of beliefs, (2) that these individual differences do not reduce to the personal importance attached to rationality, and (3) that individual differences in moralized rationality have important motivational and interpersonal consequences.

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Authors
Ståhl, T., Zaal, M. P., & Skitka, L. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Illinois Chicago (US)
  • University of Exeter (GB)
Corresponding author
Ståhl, Tomas
Venue
PLOS ONE
Published
2016-11-16
Volume
11
Issue
11
Pages
e0166332
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2550933928
Cited by
83
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 7
FWCI
4.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • University of Illinois Chicago (cc-by)
Funders
Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship (328485)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
individual differences, moral virtues, moral vices, belief formation, belief evaluation, irrational beliefs, moral motivation, charitable giving
MeSH terms
Adult, Culture, Emotions, Factor Analysis, Statistical, Female, Humans, Judgment, Logic, Male, Morals, Psychological Distance, Reproducibility of Results

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