The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Open accessAbstract
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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Self-citationInformation Aggregation in an Experimental Market
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Common Value Auctions with Insider Information
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Self-citationSEALED‐BID VERSUS OPEN AUCTIONS: THE EVIDENCE
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Self-citationFIRST‐PRICE COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS: BIDDER BEHAVIOR AND THE “WINNER'S CURSE”
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Self-citationEmpirical Testing of Auction Theory
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Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
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Risk Aversion in the Laboratory
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Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games
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Self-citationIdeas for rent: an overview of markets for technology
Arora, A., & Gambardella, A. (2010) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/dtq022 · Cited by 454
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2009-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W569242832
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 12.13
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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