The Assembly of the Self from Sensory and Motor Foundations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 80 of the 80 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The problem of the self has captivated philosophers and psychologists for centuries. While the self is clearly a central facet of the human psyche, to date we have a limited understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying this construct. The fundamental, pre-reflexive level of self-representation, often termed the minimal self has been the focus of recent work in psychology and neuroscience. This article will review recent advances in the study of the minimal self and its grounding in sensory and motor processing. I will suggest that the minimal self arises from unconscious integration of sensorimotor signals in specific brain systems, and that these same mechanisms may be of relevance to understanding disorders of the self such as schizophrenia. Finally, some influences of the minimal self on social cognition and future challenges will be discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 2×
“At the fundamental level this model allows us to conceive the self through our volition and segregate the organism from its environment, however it also shapes our sense of casualty and responsibility for these actions (Gallagher, 2000; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Jeannerod, 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self
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Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body
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Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 3×
“Based on theoretical accounts emphasizing a central role for interoceptive information in self-consciousness (Craig, 2003; Craig, 2002; Damasio, 2000; Seth, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011), recent studies have highlighted contributions of interoceptive signals such as cardiac, breathing, and visceral inputs to…”
BackgroundCentral cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (1998) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/2870 · Cited by 1,467
Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness
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Resting-state functional connectivity in neuropsychiatric disorders
Greicius, M. (2008) · Current Opinion in Neurology · doi:10.1097/wco.0b013e328306f2c5 · Cited by 1,180
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Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
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“…termed bodily self-consciousness (BSC), is required for higher and more elaborate models of self, such as the narrative self and social self (Arzy, Molnar-Szakacs, & Blanke, 2008; Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1998; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Csordas, 1994; Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Metzinger, 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence
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“conscious awareness of the stimuli (Baars, 2002) in line with theories supporting modularity in cognitive and neural processing (Fodor, 1983; Zeki & Bartels, 1998).”
Cited by
Millière, R. (2017) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245 · Cited by 206
Salomon, R., Noel, J.-P., Łukowska, M., Faivre, N., Metzinger, T., Serino, A., & Blanke, O. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.028 · Cited by 142
Self-citationPenaud, S., Yeh, D., Gaston-Bellegarde, A., & Piolino, P. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-43823-2 · Cited by 29
“…sense of identification with one’s own body (i.e., self-identification ), the sense of being located in space and time (i.e., self-location ), the feeling of having control over one’s own body (i.e., agency ) and the centeredness of experience around the body (i.e., first-person perspective ) 23 .”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Salomon, R.
- Venue
- Social Cognition
- Publisher
- Guilford Publications
- Published
- 2017-04
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 87-106
- ISSN
- 0278-016X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2605067064
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 80
- FWCI
- 1.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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