The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior
Abstract
What is the marginal effect of competitiveness on the power of electoral incentives? Addressing this question empirically is difficult because challenges to incumbents are endogenous to their behavior in office. To overcome this obstacle, we exploit a unique feature of Kansas courts: 14 districts employ partisan elections to select judges, while 17 employ noncompetitive retention elections. In the latter, therefore, challengers are ruled out. We find judges in partisan systems sentence more severely than those in retention systems. Additional tests attribute this to the incentive effects of potential competition, rather than the selection of more punitive judges in partisan districts.
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Cited by
Sekhon, J. S. (2011) · Journal of Statistical Software · doi:10.18637/jss.v042.i07 · Cited by 1,543
Diamond, A., & Sekhon, J. S. (2013) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00318 · Cited by 1,102
The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences
(2014) · National Academies Press eBooks · doi:10.17226/18613 · Cited by 599
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Ashworth, S. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823 · Cited by 535
Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference
Sekhon, J. S. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135444 · Cited by 319
Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Rose, S. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000940 · Cited by 297
The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration
Phelps, M. S. (2013) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/lapo.12002 · Cited by 260
Prosecuting from the bench? Examining sources of pro‐prosecution bias in judges
Berryessa, C. M., Dror, I. E., & McCormack, C. J. B. (2023) · Legal and Criminological Psychology · doi:10.1111/lcrp.12226 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- Gordon, S. C., & Huber, G. A.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2007-05-15
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 107-138
- ISSN
- 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
- 1554-0634
- OpenAlex
- W2132802938
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 86.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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