The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
Abstract
Elections are modeled as a public signal in an incomplete information game of revolution. By changing beliefs about the general level of antiregime sentiment, elections can make citizens more or less apt to rebel and hence make a successful revolution more or less likely. This effect makes elections valuable to incumbents that are not secure in office as they have more to gain by good results than they have to lose from bad results. Electoral fraud is modeled as a distortion of the public signal, and election monitoring is incorporated as changing the cost of this distortion. In equilibrium, citizens discount the distortion, so the average protest size and probability of revolution are the same as when the incumbent cannot commit fraud. This makes election monitoring valuable to incumbents as it ties their hands and lowers the equilibrium amount of fraud. So, elections may be held that would not occur in the absence of monitoring.
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Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
Kuran, T. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116762 · Cited by 905 · cited 2×
“This assumption is not unprecedented: (Granovetter, 1978) allows for ‘‘rabble-rousers,’’ and Kuran (1989) has citizens hurt enough by preference falsification to always support their preferred side, both of which are analogous to citizens with a dominant strategy to rebel.”
BackgroundInformation Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433 · cited 6×
“The notion that incumbent leaders, particularly dictators, attempt to manipulate the information available to citizens is also modeled with a global games framework in Edmond (2008) and Egorov and Sonin (2011).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Hyde, S. D. (2007) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.0.0001 · Cited by 250
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
Edmond, C. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17395 · Cited by 32
Cited by
Why Electoral Integrity Matters
Norris, P. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107280861 · Cited by 508
Svolik, M. W. (2020) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00018132 · Cited by 340
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?
Chen, J., & Xu, Y. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/690303 · Cited by 242
Communication Technology and Protest
Little, A. T. (2016) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/683187 · Cited by 192
At Home and Abroad: The Use of Denial-of-service Attacks during Elections in Nondemocratic Regimes
Lutscher, P. M., Weidmann, N. B., Roberts, M. E., Jonker, M., King, A., & Dainotti, A. (2020) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002719861676 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- T. Little, A.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2012-06-19
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 249-283
- ISSN
- 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
- 1554-0634
- OpenAlex
- W2074310091
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 27.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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