The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
Open accessAbstract
ProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range of cryptographic primitives, defined by rewrite rules or by equations. It can prove various security properties: secrecy, authentication, and process equivalences, for an unbounded message space and an unbounded number of sessions. It takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a dialect of the applied pi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol description into Horn clauses and determines whether the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses. This survey presents an overview of the research on ProVerif.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
New directions in cryptography
Diffie, W., & Hellman, M. (1976) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1976.1055638 · Cited by 14,713
On the security of public key protocols
Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1983.1056650 · Cited by 5,833
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Needham, R. M., & Schroeder, M. D. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359657.359659 · Cited by 2,362
A calculus of mobile processes, II
Milner, R., Parrow, J., & Walker, D. (1992) · Information and Computation · doi:10.1016/0890-5401(92)90009-5 · Cited by 1,696
Encrypted key exchange: password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks
Bellovin, S. M., & Merritt, M. (2003) · Proceedings 1992 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/risp.1992.213269 · Cited by 1,353
The AVISPA Tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
Armando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Drielsma, P. H., Heám, P. C., Kouchnarenko, O., Mantovani, J., et al. (2005) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11513988_27 · Cited by 1,343
Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR
Lowe, G. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-61042-1_43 · Cited by 872
The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
Paulson, L. C. (1998) · Cited by 836
Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting
Abdalla, M., Fouque, P.-A., & Pointcheval, D. (2005) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30580-4_6 · Cited by 833
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Denning, D. E., & Sacco, G. M. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358722.358740 · Cited by 682
Predicate Logic as Programming Language.
Kowalski, R. (1974) · IFIP Congress · Cited by 670
A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus
Abadi, M., & Gordon, A. D. (1999) · Information and Computation · doi:10.1006/inco.1998.2740 · Cited by 668
A hierarchy of authentication specifications
Lowe, G. (2002) · Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop · doi:10.1109/csfw.1997.596782 · Cited by 630
Plutus: Scalable Secure File Sharing on Untrusted Storage
Kallahalla, M., Riedel, E., Swaminathan, R., Wang, Q., & Fu, K. E. (2003) · Cited by 614
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)*
Abadi, M., & Rogaway, P. (2002) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-001-0014-7 · Cited by 613
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR
Lowe, G. (1996) · Cited by 582
Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols
Abadi, M., & Needham, R. (1996) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/32.481513 · Cited by 574
Bellovin, S. M., & Merritt, M. (1993) · Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '93 · doi:10.1145/168588.168618 · Cited by 522
OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols
Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., & Viganò, L. (2005) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-004-0055-7 · Cited by 504
Bachmair, L., Ganzinger, H., McAllester, D., & Lynch, C. (2001) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-044450813-3/50004-7 · Cited by 472
The NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview
Meadows, C. (1996) · The Journal of Logic Programming · doi:10.1016/0743-1066(95)00095-x · Cited by 459
Automated verification of selected equivalences for security protocols
Blanchet, B., Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2008) · The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming · doi:10.1016/j.jlap.2007.06.002 · Cited by 346
Self-citationSecrecy by typing in security protocols
Abadi, M. (1999) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/324133.324266 · Cited by 314
A semantic model for authentication protocols
Woo, T. Y. C., & Lam, S. S. (2002) · Proceedings 1993 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/risp.1993.287633 · Cited by 300
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., & Ryan, M. (2009) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-2009-0340 · Cited by 285
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., & Zanella Béguelin, S. (2009) · Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/1480881.1480894 · Cited by 268
Turuani, M. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11805618_21 · Cited by 257
Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Heraud, S., & Béguelin, S. Z. (2011) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_5 · Cited by 256
Refinement types for secure implementations
Bengtson, J., Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Gordon, A. D., & Maffeis, S. (2011) · ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems · doi:10.1145/1890028.1890031 · Cited by 224
Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties
Schmidt, B., Meier, S., Cremers, C., & Basin, D. (2012) · 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium · doi:10.1109/csf.2012.25 · Cited by 223
Analysis of an Electronic Voting Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus
Kremer, S., & Ryan, M. D. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31987-0_14 · Cited by 222
A Messy State of the Union: Taming the Composite State Machines of TLS
Beurdouche, B., Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., Strub, P.-Y., & Zinzindohoue, J. K. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.39 · Cited by 218
Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols
Blanchet, B. (2009) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-2009-0339 · Cited by 218
Self-citationMobile values, new names, and secure communication
Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2001) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/373243.360213 · Cited by 198
Information flow inference for ML
Pottier, F., & Simonet, V. (2002) · Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/503272.503302 · Cited by 191
Implementing TLS with Verified Cryptographic Security
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., & Strub, P. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.37 · Cited by 178
The Applied Pi Calculus: Mobile Values, New Names, and Secure Communication
Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., & Fournet, C. (2017) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3127586 · Cited by 175
Self-citationAutomatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols
Blanchet, B. (2004) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004 · doi:10.1109/secpri.2004.1301317 · Cited by 174
Self-citationA Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
Blanchet, B. (2008) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2007.1005 · Cited by 173
Self-citationDeciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories
Abadi, M., & Cortier, V. (2006) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.032 · Cited by 172
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Durgin, N., Lincoln, P., Mitchell, J., & Scedrov, A. (2004) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-2004-12203 · Cited by 168
Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or
Comon-Lundh, H., & Shmatikov, V. (2003) · 18th Annual IEEE Symposium of Logic in Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/lics.2003.1210067 · Cited by 164
The Finite Variant Property: How to Get Rid of Some Algebraic Properties
Comon, H., & Delaune, S. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-32033-3_22 · Cited by 157
Secure distributed programming with value-dependent types
Swamy, N., Chen, J., Fournet, C., Strub, P.-Y., Bhargavan, K., & Yang, J. (2011) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/2034574.2034811 · Cited by 156
Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: The Verifier ProVerif
Blanchet, B. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1_3 · Cited by 143
Self-citationTowards an Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols in First-Order Logic
Weidenbach, C. (1999) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48660-7_29 · Cited by 143
Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2004) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2003.12.023 · Cited by 141
Secure distributed programming with value-dependent types
Swamy, N., Chen, J., Cédric Fournet, A., Strub, P.-Y., Bhargavan, K., & Yang, J. (2011) · ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP) · doi:10.1145/2034773.2034811 · Cited by 140
Universally Composable Symbolic Analysis of Mutual Authentication and Key-Exchange Protocols
Canetti, R., & Herzog, J. C. (2006) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11681878_20 · Cited by 131
Aiello, W. A., Bellovin, S. M., Blaze, M., Canetti, R., Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A. D., & Reingold, O. (2004) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/996943.996946 · Cited by 128
Cryptographic Protocol Analysis on Real C Code
Goubault-Larrecq, J., & Parrennes, F. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30579-8_24 · Cited by 119
A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL Protocol Analyzer and its meta-logical properties
Escobar, S., Meadows, C. A., & Meseguer, J. (2006) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.035 · Cited by 116
Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models
Blanchet, B. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_2 · Cited by 113
Self-citationCryptographically verified implementations for TLS
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Corin, R., & Zălinescu, E. (2008) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455828 · Cited by 110
Modular verification of security protocol code by typing
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., & Gordon, A. D. (2010) · ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL) · doi:10.1145/1706299.1706350 · Cited by 107
A simple view of type-secure information flow in the π-calculus
Pottier, F. (2003) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csfw.2002.1021826 · Cited by 106
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Cortier, V., Kremer, S., & Warinschi, B. (2010) · Journal of Automated Reasoning · doi:10.1007/s10817-010-9187-9 · Cited by 106
Discovering Concrete Attacks on Website Authorization by Formal Analysis
Bansal, C., Bhargavan, K., & Maffeis, S. (2012) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2012.27 · Cited by 95
Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols
Gordon, A. D., & Jeffrey, A. (2004) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-2004-123-406 · Cited by 94
ASPIER: An Automated Framework for Verifying Security Protocol Implementations
Chaki, S., & Datta, A. (2009) · Proceedings - Computer Security Foundations Workshop/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/csf.2009.20 · Cited by 88
Automated analysis of security protocols with global state
Kremer, S., & Künnemann, R. (2016) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-160556 · Cited by 81
Automated Symbolic Proofs of Observational Equivalence
Basin, D., Dreier, J., & Sasse, R. (2015) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813662 · Cited by 77
Automating Open Bisimulation Checking for the Spi Calculus
Tiu, A. F., & Dawson, J. E. (2010) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2010.28 · Cited by 74
Extracting and verifying cryptographic models from C protocol code by symbolic execution
Aizatulin, M., Gordon, A. D., & Jürjens, J. (2011) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2046707.2046745 · Cited by 74
Cremers, C. J. F. (2008) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455787 · Cited by 72
Automatic Verification of Privacy Properties in the Applied pi Calculus
Delaune, S., Ryan, M. D., & Smyth, B. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-09428-1_17 · Cited by 65
Formal Analysis of Protocols Based on TPM State Registers
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M. D., & Steel, G. (2011) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2011.12 · Cited by 63
StatVerif: Verification of Stateful Processes
Arapinis, M., Ritter, E., & Ryan, M. D. (2011) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2011.10 · Cited by 54
Almeida, J. B., Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., & Dupressoir, F. (2013) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2508859.2516652 · Cited by 48
An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR
Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., & Turuani, M. (2005) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2005.01.015 · Cited by 44
A Formal Definition of Protocol Indistinguishability and Its Verification Using Maude-NPA
Santiago, S., Escobar, S., Meadows, C. A., & José Meseguer, B. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11851-2_11 · Cited by 41
Guiding a General-Purpose C Verifier to Prove Cryptographic Protocols
Dupressoir, F., Gordon, A. D., Jürjens, J., & Naumann, D. A. (2011) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2011.8 · Cited by 40
SATMC: A SAT-Based Model Checker for Security-Critical Systems
Armando, A., Carbone, R., & Compagna, L. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54862-8_3 · Cited by 39
Automated Analysis of Security Protocols with Global State
Kremer, S., & Künnemann, R. (2014) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.18 · Cited by 37
Strong Invariants for the Efficient Construction of Machine-Checked Protocol Security Proofs
Meier, S., Cremers, C. J. F., & Basin, D. (2010) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2010.23 · Cited by 31
Decidability of Trace Equivalence for Protocols with Nonces
Chrétien, R., Cortier, V., & Delaune, S. (2015) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2015.19 · Cited by 29
Formal analysis of privacy in Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes
Smyth, B., Ryan, M. D., & Chen, L. (2015) · Science of Computer Programming · doi:10.1016/j.scico.2015.04.004 · Cited by 16
Symbolic Malleable Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Michael Backes, A., Bendun, F., Maffei, M., Mohammadi, E., & Pecina, K. (2015) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2015.35 · Cited by 2
Cited by
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
Self-citationTowards formal verification of IoT protocols: A Review
Hofer-Schmitz, K., & Stojanović, B. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107233 · Cited by 104
An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols
Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S. (2021) · ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/3440712 · Cited by 51
Formal verification of the W3C web authentication protocol
Guirat, I. B., & Halpin, H. (2018) · Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium and Bootcamp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security · doi:10.1145/3190619.3190640 · Cited by 16
Decentralized Self-Verifiable Cryptographic Image Provenance in Social Internet of Things
Akram, J., Akram, A., & Anaissi, A. (2026) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi18080402
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchet, B.
- Venue
- Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 1-135
- ISSN
- 2474-1558 (ISSN-L)
- 2474-1566
- OpenAlex
- W2544274814
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 78
- FWCI
- 19.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.